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Abstract
We study the optimal disclosure policy of a firm that wishes to maximize its ex-
pected stock price in the classic setting in which its stock is traded by risk-averse
investors and noise traders. We find that the optimal disclosure policy is imprecise
and leads to skewed posterior beliefs. This policy subjects short positions to tail risk,
causing investors to demand a large increase in price to absorb noise-trader purchases
and leading to overvaluation. Despite providing purely firm-specific information, this
policy impacts the firm’s expected returns. We further show the firm can inflate its
price even when restricted to simple policies that withhold news lying above or below
a threshold.
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A vast and influential literature analyzes the optimal disclosure choices of firms that aim to
maximize their stock price. This research has traditionally focused on the quantity of infor-
mation firms provide as captured by the precision with which their disclosures reflect their
fundamental value (Diamond (1985), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Easley and O’Hara
(2004)). However, in many contexts, firms have flexibility not only in the quantity or preci-
sion of the information they disclose, but also the type of information they disclose.1 In this
paper, we ask whether firms can exploit the ability to tailor their disclosure policies in order
to raise the expected prices they receive for their shares.
We begin with the classic setting in which a firm’s shares are traded in a competitive
market composed of risk-averse investors and noise traders (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980),
De Long et al. (1990)). Prior to trade, the firm, which seeks to maximize its expected stock
price, has the power to commit to releasing a signal of firm value. Drawing on the Bayesian
persuasion literature, our key modeling innovation is to allow the firm to choose a signal that
possesses any statistical relationship with its idiosyncratic value (Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011)). This captures firms’ ability to tailor both the precision and nature of the infor-
mation they disclose. Given that an individual firm is unlikely to produce significant novel
information regarding the market’s future performance, we constrain the firm to selecting
among signals that aid investors only in estimating the firm’s idiosyncratic payoffs.2
Conventional wisdom from the prior literature that studies public disclosure in exchange
economies holds that the provision of additional information reduces information asymmetry
and, on average, increases prices. As a result, a firm’s optimal disclosure policy is to reveal as
much information as possible (Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Easley and O’Hara (2004)).
1As examples, firms may tailor investors’ posterior beliefs by applying accounting policies that require the
disclosure of bad news but withhold or delay the release of good news (Watts (2003)), smoothing performance
metrics over time (Acharya and Lambrecht (2015)), disclosing extreme or unusual outcomes separately, or
releasing information concerning economic risks.
2Consistent with the typical firm providing little information on market-wide performance, Bonsall et al.
(2013) finds the average response to even large “bellweather” firms’ earnings forecasts is no more than two
basis points.
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However, this literature generally confines attention to a limited range of disclosure policies,
such as signals that equal the firm’s true value plus normally-distributed noise. We find
that simple disclosure policies of this nature are not optimal upon generalizing the firm’s
choice set. Instead, the optimal policy is imprecise and leaves investors with positively-
skewed posterior beliefs regarding the firm’s value. Such a policy essentially discourages
short-selling.
As a preliminary step towards deriving this result, we assess how the firm’s expected
stock price depends upon the distribution of its idiosyncratic payoffs – which, given that
the firm has complete flexibility its disclosure policy, may take any form (Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011)). In the absence of noise trade, the market prices idiosyncratic payoffs
at their expected value. As a result, independent of their distribution, disclosure regarding
these payoffs has, on average, no impact on prices. In contrast, we show that the presence
of noise trade can create a divergence between the pricing of idiosyncratic payoffs and their
expected value, which, in turn, creates room for disclosure to influence the expected price.
The impact of noise trade on the pricing of idiosyncratic payoffs stems from the prefer-
ences of the risk-averse investors, who generally long the stock, but short the stock when
noise traders buy in sufficiently large amounts. Given their risk aversion, these investors de-
mand compensation to hold these positions, and thus noise-trader purchases (sales) drive the
stock price up (down). When the firm’s cash flows are normally distributed, as in prior work
that studies the price-impact of noise trade, short and long positions of the same magnitude
are identically risky. This implies that the market is “symmetrically” liquid: noise-trader
purchases inflate the firm’s stock price to precisely the same extent that noise-trader sales
depress this price, such that, on average, noise traders have no effect on price.
The result that noise trade has no expected impact on prices appears strong, and we show,
in fact, that it generally does not hold when moving beyond symmetric payoff distributions.
Intuitively, consider a firm with highly positively-skewed payoffs, i.e., one with a small prob-
ability of a large spike in value. When investors short such a firm’s stock, they suffer large
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losses if such a spike occurs, that is, they face downside tail risk. In contrast, when investors
long the stock, they do not face downside risk, but rather perceive a lottery-like distribution
of payoffs with a small probability of a large gain. Under most commonly-used formulations
of investor preferences, which exhibit “prudence,” the risk premium that investors require
to hold a position with downside risk is greater than that for a lottery-like position (e.g.,
Menezes et al. (1980)).3 As a result, the market exhibits “asymmetric” liquidity: noise-trader
purchases inflate the firm’s stock price to greater extent than noise-trader sales depress this
price. This implies that noise trade – even when, on average, non-directional – drives up
the firm’s stock price. Applying this reasoning, we show that, when investors have prudent
preferences, there exist asymmetric distributions over the firm’s payoffs that cause it to be,
in expectation, overvalued.
Using these findings, we next construct a disclosure policy that causes the firm’s expected
price to exceed that given perfect disclosure. As perfect disclosure eliminates all risk and
causes the firm’s price to equal its fundamental value, this implies that the optimal policy
causes the firm’s expected price to exceed its expected value. In our construction, we ex-
ploit the fact that an information signal can be crafted to ensure that skewness moves in
any desired direction. This property of skewness distinguishes it from the first two central
moments, which, according to the laws of iterated expectations and total variance, always on
average remain the same and decline, respectively, upon the arrival of information. Specif-
ically, independent of the skewness of the prior, the policy we construct leaves investors, in
expectation, with a positively-skewed posterior, thereby creating downside risk to potential
short sellers. We further show that the optimal disclosure policy never leaves investors with
a symmetric posterior such as the normal distribution, and never fully reveals the firm’s
payoffs along an interval.
To provide additional insight into the nature of the optimal disclosure policy, we next
3Such an aversion to downside risk is consistent with experimental evidence and the tail-risk premia
implied by stock and derivative prices (e.g., Harvey and Siddique (2000), Ang et al. (2006), Bollerslev and
Todorov (2011)).
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assume that investors possess constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility, which incor-
porates an aversion to downside risk (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)) and derive the
optimal disclosure policy when firm’s payoff takes on one of two values (e.g., Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2015), Breon-Drish (2015)). This policy reveals that the firm’s payoff is high with
some probability, and otherwise reveals nothing. When the payoff is not revealed, this policy
leaves investors with a posterior belief that the probability of the high state falls short of
one half, i.e., a positively-skewed belief. This policy can be thought of as providing “noisy”
bad news and “precise” good news. We further show that the optimal disparity between
the precision of good and bad news reflects a trade off between the frequency with which
investors are left with a skewed posterior belief versus the extent of skewness in this belief.
Finally, we analyze the case in which the firm is confined to selecting among policies
that either recognize or do not recognize the firm’s value. This analysis is motivated by the
fact that such “recognition” policies arise in equilibrium in models of voluntary disclosure,
are frequently optimal in persuasion settings, and may be easier to implement than generic
disclosure policies.4 We show that the firm is able to generate overvaluation using a simple
recognition policy in which they disclose their value when it lies below a threshold, and
withhold otherwise, as this policy leads to a positively-skewed posterior. However, we find
that more complex recognition policies that recognize the firms value on multiple disjoint
intervals can generate greater skewness and thus further increase expected price.
While our analysis is framed in terms of deriving the optimal disclosure policy, it also
provides new insights into the price-impact of mandated disclosures and the equilibrium
disclosures that arise in settings where firms do not have commitment power. For example,
many accounting procedures, such as the lower of cost or market rule applied to inventories,
apply a higher standard to recognizing good than bad news, thereby reducing the precision
of bad news. Our analysis suggests that such policies may, counter-intuitively, lead to over-
valuation. Furthermore, models of voluntary disclosure suggest that, in equilibrium, firms
4See, for example, Verrecchia (1983), Göx and Wagenhofer (2010), Bouvard et al. (2015), Goldstein and
Leitner (2018), Dworczak and Martini (2019), and Szydlowski (2020).
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may provide more good news than bad news. Given that investors’ posteriors given non-
disclosure are negatively skewed in such equilibria, our results suggest that they are likely
to lead firms to be, on average, undervalued.
Related literature. Our paper fits into the growing Bayesian persuasion literature. From
a technical perspective, the problem of persuasion in an asset-pricing setting is difficult, as
equilibrium prices depend upon all moments of an asset’s payoffs. As a result, no general
form for the optimal policy can be derived; this policy depends upon both investors’ utility
functions and their priors, and, even under specific distributional assumptions, is both an-
alytically and computationally difficult to solve for (Dughmi and Xu (2019)). In contrast,
existing models of persuasion typically assume an objective function that depends only upon
the posterior expected value; see Kolotilin (2018) and Dworczak and Martini (2019)) for dis-
cussions of this assumption. Given these challenges, in our general analysis, our focus is on
characterizing properties of the optimal disclosure policy that distinguish it from the policies
that are the focus of the existing disclosure literature.
Our paper further relates to prior work that finds investor risk aversion can cause im-
perfect and/or asymmetric disclosures to be optimal. Suijs (2008) show in an overlapping-
generations model that disclosure that is more precise given negative than positive news
can reduce price volatility and increase expected prices by lowering the risk premium when
negative news arrives. Armstrong et al. (2016) demonstrate that risk-averse managers issue
more precise disclosures when their firm performs poorly when increasing disclosure precision
demands that they incur a personal cost. Gollier and Schlee (2011) consider the impact of
information regarding aggregate consumption on stock prices, finding that additional infor-
mation can, on average, reduce these prices. Note this work operates under the assumption
that the precision of information a firm releases influences its risk premium, which, in a large
economy, requires that this information aids investors in assessing the market’s performance.
In contrast, our motivation for imperfect disclosure holds even when firms’ information is
6
specific to their own performance.5
Our results also have implications for the empirical and theoretical asset-pricing literature
that considers how skewness influences prices. Extensions of the CAPM to consider investor
preferences for skewness suggest that only coskewness with the market portfolio should be
priced (Kraus and Litzenberger (1976)). This has led much of the empirical research on skew-
ness to focus on its systematic component (Harvey and Siddique (2000), Ang et al. (2006)).
In contrast, our paper suggests that idiosyncratic skewness influences prices in the presence
of noise trade, providing a potential explanation for the empirically documented negative
relationship between idiosyncratic skewness and returns (Boyer et al. (2010)). Finally, our
paper contributes to the literature on short-sale constraints. Notably, Lamont (2012) finds
that firms take legal and regulatory actions to harm short sellers in order to maintain inflated
prices. Our model suggests that an empirically-unexplored means through which firms may
impede short-selling and thus foster overvaluation is through their disclosure policies.
Structure of the paper The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our
baseline model. In Section 3, we present distribution-free properties of the optimal disclosure
policy. In Section 4, we explicitly solve for the optimal policy in a binary model and in Section
5, we analyze recognition policies and a subset of these policies that disclose the firms value
when it lies on either above or below a threshold. Section 6 extends the model to consider
a multi-asset economy, disclosure about systematic risks, and private information. Section
7 concludes.
2 Model
We analyze the optimal disclosure policy of a firm whose stock is traded in a market consisting
noise traders and risk-averse investors. We conduct this analysis within a generalized version
5Similarly, Jiang and Yang (2017) study the optimal disclosure policy when liquidity motives may force
a firm to inefficiently retain its shares, and found that disclosing a lower bound is the optimal means to
mitigate these inefficiencies.
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of the standard model of competitive trade between homogeneous, uninformed investors and
noise traders (e.g., De Long et al. (1990)). Formally, consider a firm that has a random payoff
𝑣 distributed according to a prior distribution 𝜇0(·) with support 𝒱 ⊆ R.6 A continuum of
(rational) investors, indexed by 𝑖 ∈ [0, 1], trade in the firm’s stock, submitting demand
orders of 𝐷𝑖. Because each of these traders is small, they behave as price takers. In addition
to the stock, these investors trade in a risk-free asset, in unlimited supply, with rate of
return normalized to 1 (thus, the risk-free asset is the numeraire). The investors possess
homogeneous initial wealth and preferences 𝑢(𝑤) defined over their terminal wealth, 𝑤. For
notational simplicity, but without loss of generality, we set the investors’ initial wealth to
zero.7 We assume that preferences are smooth, increasing (i.e., 𝑢′ > 0), risk-averse (i.e.,
𝑢′′ < 0), and prudent (i.e., 𝑢′′′ > 0). Note many commonly used utility function including
CARA and CRRA exhibit prudence (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)). We return to the
role of prudence role later in this section.
The investors trade alongside noise traders who, in the aggregate, demand −𝑧 units of
stock, where 𝑧 is independent of the firm’s payoff 𝑣 and has variance 𝜎2𝑧 ≡ Var[𝑧] > 0. We
assume that 𝑧 is symmetrically distributed around zero, such that 𝑚𝑧 ≡ E[𝑧] = 0. Moreover,
we assume that the stock is in zero net supply, such that the residual supply that must be
absorbed by the risk-averse investors is 𝑧. The assumption that the stock is in zero net
supply plays an important role in our analysis, as it rules out a direct effect of disclosure
on the risk premium. To be precise, given this assumption, if there were no noise trade in
our model, the firm’s price would simply equal its expected payoffs, leaving no room for
disclosure to impact price, on average.
In Section 6.1, we show that the zero net supply assumption implies that our model,
which is cast in terms of a single firm, is equivalent to one in which a firm is embedded in
a large economy and discloses information about an idiosyncratic component of its value.8
6Throughout, we use a tilde to denote a random variable (e.g., “𝑣”) and we drop the tilde to indicate a
realization of that random variable (e.g., “𝑣”).
7Non-zero initial wealth 𝑊 can be absorbed into the utility function by redefining 𝑢*(𝑥) = 𝑢(𝑊 + 𝑥).
8Note we do not require that the firm’s disclosure explicitly concerns only components of its value that
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The notion that the firm’s disclosure provides investors with novel information regarding its
idiosyncratic performance, as opposed to aggregate performance, appears to match individual
firms’ financial disclosures, which lead to large firm-specific returns but very small market
returns (e.g., Bonsall et al. (2013)).9 If the average supply were instead positive, which
would correspond to the firm disclosing information about market-wide risks, our results
would trade off against the conventional impact of disclosure on the risk premium (Gollier
and Schlee (2011)). We extend the model to analyze this case in Section 6.2.
The model’s timeline is as follows. There are four dates, 𝑡 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. At 𝑡 = 1, the
firm publicly commits to a disclosure policy, that is, it chooses a signal 𝑠 about its payoff
𝑣. At 𝑡 = 2, the firm publicly discloses the realization 𝑠 of the signal 𝑠 and the risk-averse
investors form a posterior belief 𝜇(·) about the firm’s payoff 𝑣. At 𝑡 = 3, conditional on the
realized signal, risk-averse investors submit their orders alongside the noise traders, and the
equilibrium price 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇) is set to clear the market. Finally, at 𝑡 = 4, the firm’s payoff 𝑣
realizes and is paid out as a dividend to the firm’s shareholders.
We allow the firm to choose any disclosure policy subject only to the constraint that
the investors’ expected utility induced by the firm’s policy is finite. Full commitment is
a strong assumption. However, the ability of the firm to choose among arbitrary signals
may be interpreted either as the choice of what information to gather and present in the
financial statements and/or as a decision regarding how to disclose information that is readily
available to the firm. For example, the firm’s decision may be thought of as a selection among
accounting methods. Note also that, while our analysis is cast in terms of characterizing the
optimal disclosure policy, our results also provide insight into how an exogenous disclosure
are idiosyncratic. Instead, we only require that the information in a firm’s disclosures on systematic risk
could be gleaned from other sources such as other firms’ disclosures or macroeconomic indicators.
9Note that Savor and Wilson (2016) find more significant market-wide responses to early announcing
firms’ financial disclosures. However, the information in early announcers’ earnings regarding the market’s
performance, if removed, would likely come out soon after through other news events, such as other firms’
earnings announcements. Consequently, it is unlikely these firms have a long-lived impact on the amount of
information known about the market.
9For example, if the disclosure policy induced posteriors beliefs characterized by a t-distribution, then
the expected utility of CARA investors would not be finite.
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policy – such as an accounting standard – influences stock prices in the presence of noise
trade. Finally, in Section 5, we consider a more restricted commitment environment where
the firm is confined to selecting among policies that either reveal or withhold its value.
Formally, a disclosure policy is captured by a signal 𝑠 that is statistically related to 𝑣,
such that upon observing the signal’s realization 𝑠 = 𝑠, investors update their beliefs about
the firm’s payoff 𝑣 according to Bayes’ rule. Equivalently, we can identify the realization
of a signal, 𝑠 = 𝑠, with the posterior distribution that it induces, denoted 𝜇(·), and the
disclosure policy with the distribution 𝜏(·) of posterior distributions that are obtained upon
conditioning on the realized signal. As shown in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), letting
Δ(𝒱) denote the set of all probability distributions on the support 𝒱 , there exists a signal
that leads to the distribution of posteriors 𝜏(·) if and only if 𝜏(·) satisfies the Bayesian
plausibility constraint, ∫︁
Δ(𝒱)
𝜏(𝜇)d𝜇 = 𝜇0. (1)
This constraint states that the average posterior probability of any realization of the firm’s
value is equal to its prior probability.
We assume that the firm selects its signal ex ante to maximize its expected price. For-








In other words, the firm’s objective function is obtained by taking two expectations. First,
for every posterior 𝜇(·) on the support of the disclosure policy 𝜏(·), the firm evaluates the
expected price E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)], which averages out all possible realizations of the noise-trader
demand. Then, the firm takes the expectation of this average price across all possible
realizations of the posterior 𝜇(·).
In our analyses, we reference a few notable examples of disclosure policies that are com-
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mon in prior literature. First, we refer to a perfect disclosure policy as one in which the signal
𝑠 = 𝑣 almost surely. That is, disclosure is perfect if it always perfectly reveals the firm’s
payoff. Second, we refer to a policy of additive noise as one for which 𝑠 = 𝑣 + ?̃?, where ?̃? is
independent of 𝑣. In addition, we refer to recognition policies, which map probabilistically
each realization 𝑣 = 𝑣 of the firm’s value into one of two messages: either that particular
realization is disclosed perfectly, i.e., 𝑠 = 𝑣; or it is withheld, i.e., 𝑠 = ∅. A recognition
policy can be represented by a function 𝜔 : 𝒱 → [0, 1], which gives the probability 𝜔(𝑣)
that each realization of firm value 𝑣 = 𝑣 is withheld. Finally, when discussing the case in
which the firm’s payoff is binary, we consider binary signal structures, 𝑠 ∈ {𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐺}, where
𝑠𝐺 (𝑠𝐵) stands for “good” (“bad”) news, in the sense that the posterior is more optimistic
conditional on good news than on bad news. Binary signals are fully characterized by the
probability that the signal is high conditional on each realized payoff, 𝑞𝑣 ≡ Pr[𝑠 = 𝑠𝐺|𝑣 = 𝑣].
Note that the set up to this point places few constraints on investors’ preferences and no
constraints on the prior distribution over the firm’s payoffs. We start, in the next section,
by characterizing properties of the optimal disclosure policy in this general case. However,
no generic form for the optimal policy can be derived without making further assumptions
regarding distributions and preferences. To provide further insight into the optimal disclosure
policy, we then consider a binary model in which the policy can be explicitly derived.
3 General Results
In this section, we characterize general properties of the optimal disclosure policy. Most
notably, we show that this policy is neither perfect, nor is it, in general, uninformative.
Moreover, the optimal policy leads the firm’s expected price to exceed its expected cash flows
by causing the market to be more liquid for noise-trader sales than purchases (Proposition
1). These findings stand in contrast to much of the prior theoretical literature on disclosure,
which typically finds that prices are maximized when firms provide full information and that,
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on average, disclosure brings the firm’s price closer to its true value (see, e.g., Goldstein and
Yang (2017)).
Next, we establish two stronger results concerning the optimal policy. When investors’
prior is continuous, not only is the optimal policy imperfect, but also it never reveals the
firm’s value with positive probability (Proposition 2). Likewise, when the prior possesses
mass points, this policy reveals the firm’s value when it takes on at most a single value with
positive mass. These results illustrate that recognition policies in which the state is revealed
when it falls above or below a threshold, while frequently optimal in persuasion settings, are
not optimal in a financial-market setting given the dependence of prices on higher moments.
Finally, we show that the optimal policy never leaves investors with symmetric posterior
beliefs such as the normal – despite the common focus on normally-distributed signals in the
disclosure literature (Corollary 1). This result suggests that firms with greater flexibility in
their disclosure policies will exhibit more skewed returns.
3.1 Equilibrium pricing and overvaluation
As a first step, we derive the firm’s price and demonstrate that, given the presence of noise
trade, this price need not equate to the firm’s expected cash flows, on average. To be precise,
we show that, while symmetric distributions lead the firm to be accurately priced, there exist
asymmetric distributions such that the market price, on average, is greater than the expected
payoff, which we refer to as “overvaluation.”
Note if the market price is 𝑃 , the terminal wealth of an investor 𝑖 who submits an order
𝐷𝑖 is 𝐷𝑖(𝑣 − 𝑃 ). When the investor possesses the posterior 𝜇(·) over the firm’s payoff, they
choose their demand to maximize:
max
𝐷𝑖
E𝜇 [𝑢(𝐷𝑖(𝑣 − 𝑃 )] ,
where E𝜇 is the expectation with respect to the posterior distribution 𝜇(·) as induced by
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the signal realization 𝑠 = 𝑠. Market clearing requires the aggregate demand by investors be
equal to the aggregate supply of noise traders, that is,
∫︀
𝐷𝑖d𝑖 = 𝑧. Because all investors
are homogeneous, their equilibrium demands are identical, 𝐷𝑖 = 𝐷 for all 𝑖, and therefore
the market-clearing condition reduces to 𝐷 = 𝑧. The following familiar fixed-point equation
for the market-clearing price is a straightforward rearranging of the investor’s first-order
condition evaluated at the market-clearing condition:10
𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇) =
E𝜇[𝑣𝑢
′(𝑧(𝑣 − 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)))]
E𝜇[𝑢′(𝑧(𝑣 − 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)))]
. (3)
Observe that the price is a function both of the realized noise-trader demand, 𝑧, and of
investors’ posterior, 𝜇(·); in order to clear the market given a supply 𝑧, the price adjusts
so as to ensure that investors are willing to take the other side of noise traders’ demands.
Moving forward, we assume that equation (3) has a unique solution 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇), which simplifies
the exposition; however, the essence of our results does not depend upon this assumption.11
We seek to identify posterior distributions that lead to overvaluation, in the sense that
they cause the average price across all realizations of noise-trader demand to exceed the
expected payoff. The following definition formalizes this notion.
Definition 1. A posterior 𝜇(·) induces overvaluation (undervaluation) if and only if E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] >
E𝜇[𝑣] (resp., E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] < E𝜇[𝑣]). Otherwise, we say that 𝜇(·) induces accurate valuation.
We next state two lemmas that will be used as building blocks for our main results
concerning the optimal disclosure policy. First, we show that for any symmetric prior distri-
bution the firm is accurately valued, where a random variable 𝑣 is symmetrically distributed
if 𝑣 and its rotation 2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑣 have the same distribution.12
10The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied because the utility is concave.
11In the end o this section, we show that a sufficient condition for this to hold is that investors have CARA
utility. Note further that, if this assumption is dropped, our results upon focusing on, for any given 𝜇(·), a
specific solution for price as a function of 𝑧. Technical details are available upon request.
12In particular, if the distribution of 𝑣 admits a density 𝑓(·), then 𝑣 is symmetrically distributed if and
only if 𝑓(E𝜇[𝑣] + 𝑥) = 𝑓(E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑥)) for all 𝑥 ∈ R.
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Lemma 1. If the distribution 𝜇(·) is symmetric, then 𝜇(·) induces accurate valuation, i.e.,
E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] = E𝜇[𝑣].
To understand this lemma, note that, given a posterior 𝜇(·), when noise traders sell 𝑧
shares, the price is driven below expected firm value, i.e., 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇) ≤ E𝜇[𝑣], and vice versa
when these traders buy 𝑧 shares. Importantly, when the firm’s value is symmetric, price is
driven up by the exact same amount when noise traders buy 𝑧 as it is driven down when
they sell 𝑧. Intuitively, under a symmetric payoff distribution, investors face identical risk
whether they long or short the stock, and thus require price move by the same amount in
order to take the other side of noise traders’ demands. Furthermore, because noise trading is
symmetrically distributed, there is an equal likelihood that noise traders buy and sell 𝑧, such
that noise trade has no on-average impact on price. This result is familiar from the linear
equilibria that commonly arise in noisy rational-expectations models such as Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980). Given that price is a linear function of noise trade in
such equilibria, sell and buy orders have precisely offsetting impacts on the price.
In contrast, when the distribution of payoffs is not symmetric, i.e., when it exhibits
skewness, it is no longer the case that longing and shorting expose a trader to identical
risk. Intuitively, short and long positions are exposed to the skewness of the underlying
distribution in opposing directions. If payoffs are positively skewed, investors who are long
(short) face positively (negatively) skewed returns. Consequently, if investors have prefer-
ences for skewness, the premium they require to absorb noise-trader purchases differs than
the premium they require to absorb noise-trader sales. As such, the firm’s expected price
will deviate from its expected payoffs in the presence of a skewed distribution.
Given our assumption that 𝑢′′′ > 0, which implies investors prefer positive skewness
(Menezes et al. (1980)), this intuitive argument suggests that positively-skewed payoff dis-
tributions lead to overvaluation in the presence of noise trade. However, the link between
payoff skewness and investor demands, and thus equilibrium prices, is difficult to formalize
without placing specific assumptions on investor preferences and payoff distributions. This is
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analogous to the link between payoff dispersion and prices: while return variability is almost
ubiquitously posited to decrease prices and increase returns, even under strict risk aversion,
distributional orderings such as increasing variance and second-order stochastic dominance
are not sufficient to ensure a decline in prices (e.g., Gollier (2001)).
In the next section, we make the link between skewness and prices explicit under a binary
formulation of the model. For the purposes of this section, however, we need only to demon-
strate that there always exists some asymmetric distribution that leads to overvaluation.
Lemma 2. There exists a distribution ?̂?(·) with support 𝒱 ⊆ 𝒱 that induces overvaluation.
The intuition for this result is that, upon deviating slightly away from a symmetric
distribution towards an asymmetric distribution, under prudent preferences, the firm is no
longer accurately valued. Again, this follows as investors face different risks when longing
and shorting the stock under an asymmetric distribution.13 In general, such a deviation may
just as well lead to undervaluation as it will lead to overvaluation. However, we show that
one can always find a deviation in a direction that leads to overvaluation.
3.2 Characteristics of the optimal disclosure policy
We are now in a position to analyze the optimal disclosure policy. To start, we define
the notion of a disclosure policy that creates overvaluation. This definition is analogous to
Definition 1, but averages over the posterior beliefs that are created by a given policy.
Definition 2. A disclosure policy 𝜏(·) induces overvaluation if the ex ante expected price is
greater than the ex ante expectation of the firm’s payoff,
∫︀
Δ(𝒱) E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)]d𝜏(𝜇) > E𝜇0 [𝑣].
While this notion of overvaluation might appear to predict that a firm would exhibit
negative expected returns, this need not be the case. Recall that, for sake of simplicity, our
13By contrast, when utility is quadratic in wealth (so that 𝑢′′′ = 0), not only symmetric, but also asym-
metric distributions induce accurate valuation (see Lemma D.1 in Appendix D). This occurs because under
quadratic utility investors are insensitive to the third and higher moments of the distribution. Note the case
in which 𝑢′′′ < 0 can be ruled out as it is inconsistent with a globally concave, increasing utility function.
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baseline model assumes that the firm’s payoff is purely idiosyncratic. The model is easily
extended to allow for the more realistic scenario in which firm value includes a systematic risk,
and thus the firm’s price exhibits a risk premium – again, as long as the novel information in
firm’s disclosure concerns the idiosyncratic component of its value. Together with investors’
risk aversion, if this risk premium is sufficiently large, even a firm that is overvalued in
accordance with Definition 2 will earn positive expected returns; we conduct such an analysis
in Section 6.1. Thus, this notion of overvaluation should be interpreted as relative to the
firm’s risk-adjusted valuation, i.e., the valuation that would arise in the absence of noise
trade.
Given this definition, we have the following result.
Proposition 1. There exists a disclosure policy that induces overvaluation.
We prove this result by explicitly constructing a disclosure policy that leads to overvalu-
ation. The policy we construct is a recognition policy, revealing the underlying payoff with
some probability that depends upon this payoff. The probability that each payoff is recog-
nized is set such that the policy, when it does not reveal the firm’s payoff, leaves investors
with an asymmetric posterior belief that leads to overvaluation (according to Lemma 2, such
a posterior belief always exists). Following the intuition provided in the previous section,
this posterior belief generally exhibits positive skewness. Thus, independent of the skewness
of the prior, the policy leads investors to have, on average, positively-skewed posteriors. The
ability of information to generate skewness represents a key departure from the first two mo-
ments: on average, the laws of total expectation and variance imply that the mean remains
unchanged upon the release of new information, and the variance falls.
The next proposition characterizes additional properties of the optimal policy.
Proposition 2. An optimal disclosure policy, 𝜏 *:
(i) assigns positive probability to at most one degenerate distribution; and
(ii) zero probability to non-degenerate symmetric distributions.
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Put simply, part (i) of the proposition states that, when the firm’s value is continuously
distributed, the optimal disclosure policy never perfectly reveals the firm’s value with positive
probability. Likewise, if the firm’s value has mass points, the optimal policy reveals the firm’s
value with positive probability when it takes on at most one specific value. Intuitively, under
a policy that perfectly reveals multiple realizations of firm value, the firm is accurately valued
when any of these realizations occur. As a result, such a policy gives up an opportunity to
create overvaluation. We formalize this notion by showing that, starting from a policy that
reveals multiple payoffs, there is an alternative policy that leads to a greater expected price.
Conditional upon one of these payoffs occurring, rather than revealing the payoff, the policy
randomly either reveals this payoff or sends a new signal (where the probabilities of these
two events depend upon the payoff). Upon observing this new signal, investors are left with
asymmetric posterior beliefs that lead to an inflated price.
Part (ii) of the proposition states that the optimal policy never leaves investors with a
symmetric posterior. The intuition for this result is similar to part (i): because symmetric
distributions lead the firm to be accurately valued, leaving investors with such a posterior
again gives up the opportunity to create overvaluation. We show this in a similar manner
to part (i), beginning with a policy that leaves investors with a symmetric posterior, and
constructing an alternative policy that leads to a higher expected price. Rather than sending
the signal that leads to an symmetric posterior, this alternative policy randomly either reveals
the firm’s value or sends a new signal that leads to an inflated price.
Proposition 2 is relevant because it suggests that, if the firm could optimally design its
disclosure policy ex ante, then investors would never trade under symmetric beliefs, such as
the normal distribution – which is widespread in the asset-pricing and disclosure literatures.
Furthermore, it implies that recognition polices, which are commonly optimal in persuasion
settings, are not optimal in the financial-market setting. We summarize these implications
of the proposition in the next corollary.
Corollary 1. Both perfect disclosure and recognition policies are suboptimal. Furthermore,
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if the firm’s payoff is normally distributed, then a signal that equals the firm’s true value plus
normally-distributed independent noise is suboptimal.
In the remainder of the paper, we conduct further analyses of the model under the
assumption that the risk-averse investors have CARA utility, 𝑢(𝑤) = exp(−𝜌𝑤), where
𝜌 > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Given this assumption, the equation for
price (equation (3)) can be solved explicitly:
𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇) = E𝜇[𝑣] +
E𝜇[(𝑣 − E𝜇[𝑣]) exp(−𝜌𝑧𝑣)]
E𝜇[exp(−𝜌𝑧𝑣)]
. (4)
We will also reference a second-order Taylor expansion of equation (4) to illustrate the ideas
underlying our results. Specifically, expanding equation (4) as a function of the noise-trader
demand and taking its expectation yields:











(see Appendix B for a formal derivation). This approx-
imation makes transparent the ideas underlying Proposition 2. Specifically, observe from
equation (5) that, as the posterior variance shrinks, the average price converges towards
the expected firm payoff. Roughly speaking, this is the reason why the optimal disclosure
policy almost never fully resolves investor uncertainty (except, potentially, at a mass point).
Furthermore, equation (5) demonstrates that, if the posterior distribution is symmetric, the
average price again converges towards the expected firm payoff because, in this case, the
posterior skewness Skew𝜇[𝑣] goes to zero. Hence, the optimal disclosure policy does not lead
to symmetric posteriors.
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4 Optimal Disclosure Policy Under Binary Fundamen-
tals
In this section, we derive the firm’s optimal policy when the firm’s payoff 𝑣 belongs to
𝒱 = {𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣,𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣} ≡ {𝑣𝐿, 𝑣𝐻}. We denote investors’ posterior given the signal 𝑠 by
𝑞 ≡ Pr [𝑣 = 𝑣𝐻 | 𝑠 = 𝑠] and assume now that noise trade 𝑧 is normally distributed with mean
𝑚𝑧 = 0 and variance 𝜎
2
𝑧 > 0. We start by deriving an explicit expression for the firm’s stock
price, 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝑞), as a function of realized noisy trade 𝑧 = 𝑧 and a given posterior belief 𝑞, which
is familiar from prior work that employs CARA utility with binary payoffs (e.g., Kurlat and
Veldkamp (2015), Smith (2019)).
Lemma 3. Suppose that the firm’s payoff is binary. Then, the firm’s stock price equals
𝑃 (𝑧, 𝑞) = 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣
𝑞(exp(−2𝜌𝑧𝜎𝑣) + 1)− 1
𝑞(exp(−2𝜌𝑧𝜎𝑣)− 1) + 1
. (6)
The firm’s equilibrium price possesses several intuitive properties. First, it is bounded
between the low and high values of the firm’s payoff, 𝑚𝑣−𝜎𝑣 and 𝑚𝑣+𝜎𝑣, which is necessary
to ensure the absence of an arbitrage opportunity. Furthermore, when investors are risk
neutral (i.e., when 𝜌→ 0), the price converges to the expected firm payoff 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣 (2𝑞 − 1).
However, when investors are risk averse (i.e., when 𝜌 ̸= 0) and 𝑧 > 0 (𝑧 < 0), the price is
greater (less) than the expected payoff; that is, there is a negative (positive) “risk” premium.
The case of a binary payoff starkly illustrates the difference in risk to shorting and longing
a stock under an asymmetric payoff distribution and the resultant effect on the equilibrium
price. Suppose first that 𝑞 = 0.1. Then, when a trader takes the other side of noise-trader
sales, they perceive a lottery-like payoff, with a 10% probability of a large gain. In contrast,
when a trader takes the other side of noise-trader purchases, they perceive a downside risk
with a 10% probability of a large loss. The converse holds when 𝑞 = 0.9.
Because investors are averse to downside risk, markets are asymmetrically liquid for
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purchases relative to sales when 𝑞 = 0.1, and vice versa when 𝑞 = 0.9. This can be seen in
the price, which is a nonlinear function of the realized noise-trader demand 𝑧. Specifically,
the price function reacts more strongly to a buy order of 𝑧 than a sell order of 𝑧 when
𝑞 < 1/2, and vice versa when 𝑞 > 1/2. Therefore, noise trade increases (decreases) price, on
average, if and only if 𝑞 < 1/2 (𝑞 > 1/2).
Armed with Lemma 3, we now derive the optimal disclosure policy. Let 𝑞0 ≡ Pr[𝑣 = 𝑣𝐻 ]
denote the prior probability of the high payoff, with 𝑞0 ∈ (0, 1). Ex ante, the firm chooses a
disclosure policy 𝜏(·) to solve the program (2). For binary payoffs, this program is equivalent
to choosing a distribution over the posterior probability of the high payoff, 𝑞, subject to the
requirement that, in expectation, the posterior equals the prior 𝑞0:
E [Pr[𝑣 = 𝑣𝐻 |𝑠]] = 𝑞0. (7)
The following result characterizes the firm’s optimal disclosure policy.




(i) If 𝑞0 ≤ 𝑞, then the optimal disclosure policy is uninformative (i.e., 𝑠 = ∅ a.e.);
(ii) If 𝑞0 > 𝑞, then a binary signal 𝑠 ∈ {𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐺} is an optimal disclosure policy, where
Pr[𝑠 = 𝑠𝐵|𝑣 = 𝑣𝐿] = 1,
Pr[𝑠 = 𝑠𝐵|𝑣 = 𝑣𝐻 ] = 𝜅 ∈ (0, 1),
and 𝜅 is chosen so that Pr[𝑣 = 𝑣𝐻 |𝑠 = 𝑠𝐵] = 𝑞.14





, the optimal disclosure is
uninformative. In contrast, for 𝑞0 > 𝑞, a binary signal is optimal. This policy always sends
the low signal when 𝑣 = 𝑣𝐿 and sends the low signal given 𝑣 = 𝑣𝐻 with probability 𝜅, where
14Note there also exist other optimal policies in which more than two signals sent. However, all such
policies are essentially equivalent to the binary signal in the sense that they induce the same distribution
over posterior beliefs, and thus it is redundant to separately study these policies. As an example, consider
an alternative policy that, whenever the optimal binary signal would send signal 𝑠𝐵 , instead randomly sends
either signal 𝑠𝐵,1 or 𝑠𝐵,2. Under this alternative policy, both the signals 𝑠𝐵,1 and 𝑠𝐵,2 lead to the same
posterior belief as 𝑠𝐵 , and thus the distribution over posteriors is unchanged.
20













E(P ) Risk Neutral
E(P ) Optimal Disclosure
E(P ) No Disclosure
q̂
Figure 1: The optimal disclosure policy (red line) concavifies the expected price as a function of beliefs
𝑞0. Parameters: 𝜌 = 2,𝑚𝑧 = 0, 𝜎
2
𝑧 = 1.
𝜅 is such that the posterior belief that 𝑣 = 𝑣𝐻 given the low signal is 𝑞. In this case, the
optimal disclosure policy is more precise when it reveals good news (𝑠 = 𝑠𝐺) than when it
reveals bad news (𝑠 = 𝑠𝐵): upon observing 𝑠 = 𝑠𝐺, investors know for sure that payoff is
high, whereas upon observing 𝑠 = 𝑠𝐵, investors perceive, with the non-zero probability 𝑞,
that the payoff is actually high. Note that, as 𝑞 < 1/2, given the low signal, investors assign a
relatively small probability to the firm’s payoff being high – hence, the posterior is positively
skewed. The parameter 𝜅 can be thought of as the extent of asymmetry in the precision of
the disclosure given that it reveals positive versus negative news. For brevity, we refer to it
as the disclosure’s imprecision, but emphasize it specifically refers to the imprecision of the
disclosure when it reveals bad news.
To illustrate why the optimal policy takes this form, Figure 1 depicts Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011)’s method to deriving the optimal policy. The blue curve depicts the average
price, E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝑞)], as a function of investors’ posterior 𝑞 and the grey curve depicts the risk-
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neutral price 𝑃 = E[𝑣]. Consistent with Lemma 1, the average price intersects the risk-
neutral price exactly at 𝑞 = 1/2, when the payoff distribution is symmetric. In the absence
of disclosure, the firm is overvalued for low posteriors, and undervalued for high posteriors.
The reason, again, is that the firm’s payoff is positively skewed for low posteriors (𝑞 ≤ 1/2)
and negatively skewed for high posteriors (𝑞 ≥ 1/2).
The red curve in Figure 1 is the concave closure of the average price as a function of the
posterior 𝑞. This curve reflects the maximum expected payoffs that can be obtained by either
a policy of non-disclosure or a policy that mixes over two posterior beliefs, and characterizes
the firm’s value function for a given prior belief 𝑞0. The cutoff 𝑞 is the tangency point between
the red and blue curves. For priors below the cutoff 𝑞, an uninformative disclosure policy is
optimal, because the prior lies on the concave closure. Intuitively, when 𝑞0 < 𝑞, the prior is
already significantly positively skewed and thus leads to overvaluation; disclosure of any sort
would only serve to reduce this overvaluation. For priors above the cutoff 𝑞, an expected
price on the concave closure can be obtained by a disclosure policy that mixes between the
two posterior beliefs 𝑞 = 1 and 𝑞 = 𝑞.
To provide intuition for the impact of varying the disclosure’s imprecision 𝜅 on the ex
ante expected price, we now apply the approximate pricing function (5) to the binary case.
When 𝑠 = 𝑠𝐺, it is common knowledge that the fundamental is high, and hence, price equals
𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣 for any realization of noise trade. By contrast, when 𝑠 = 𝑠𝐵, the approximate
pricing equation (5) becomes:




where 𝑞(𝜅) ≡ Pr[𝑣 = 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣|𝑠 = 𝑠𝐵] is the posterior conditional on bad news as a function
of 𝜅. Taking the ex ante expectation of the price (with respect to both the posterior 𝑞 and
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noise-trader demand 𝑧) yields an approximate ex ante price of:




2⏟  ⏞  
magnitude of overvaluation
. (8)
Equation (8) reveals that imprecision 𝜅 has two effects on the ex ante price. First, a higher
𝜅 directly increases the probability of realizing bad news, Pr[𝑠 = 𝑠𝐵] = 1 − 𝑞0 + 𝜅𝑞0, by
increasing the probability that the high payoff is misclassified. Therefore, an increase in
𝜅 raises the probability of realizing a posterior that leads to overvaluation. Second, 𝜅 has
a non-monotonic effect on the magnitude of overvaluation conditional on bad news. In
particular, in the extreme cases where 𝑞(𝜅) = 0 or 𝑞(𝜅) = 1/2, the distribution is degenerate
and symmetric, respectively, and thus the firm is accurately valued (in accordance with
Lemma 1). In contrast, when 𝑞(𝜅) ∈ (0, 1/2), the distribution is positively skewed, leading
to overvaluation. Thus, the optimal 𝜅 sets 𝑞(𝜅) ∈ (0, 1/2). Note further that the optimal 𝜅
exceeds the value of 𝜅 that maximizes overvaluation conditional on bad news, ?̄?; otherwise,
an increase to ?̄? would both increase the frequency and the magnitude of overvaluation.15
Above ?̄?, the optimal level of 𝜅 trades off the frequency and magnitude of overvaluation.
We next show that the optimal degree of imprecision 𝜅 decreases in the the prior 𝑞0.
To understand this inverse relation, recall that under the optimal policy, independent of the
prior, bad news leaves investors with the same posterior belief: Pr(𝑣 = 𝑣𝐻 |𝑠 = 𝑠𝐵) = 𝑞. Now,
as the prior 𝑞0 increases, fixing the disclosure policy, the posterior Pr(𝑣 = 𝑣𝐻 |𝑠 = 𝑠𝐵) also
increases. Thus, as 𝑞0 increases, in order to ensure that the posterior given negative news
remains at 𝑞, the optimal disclosure policy provides negative news that is more informative
by misclassifying the high payoff less frequently. The general intuition underlying this result
is that, when a firm’s fundamentals are less positively skewed (which corresponds to a greater
𝑞0 in the binary model), then to induce overvaluation, it must create more skewness through
its disclosure policy.
15Note that 𝜅 is, in fact, strictly greater than ?̄?, as a marginal increase in 𝜅 from ?̄? has no effect on
overvaluation, but has a linear effect on the probability of overvaluation.
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Corollary 2. Suppose that the firm’s payoff is binary. The optimal degree of imprecision 𝜅
is decreasing in the prior probability that the payoff is high, 𝑞0.
Before concluding this section we note that the optimal level of imprecision in the dis-
closure also depends on the amount of noise trading, as captured by 𝜎𝑧. At the same time,
imprecision affects the sensitivity of prices with respect to 𝑧, and thus influences liquidity.
We leave it to future research to explore this interaction.
5 Recognition and Truncation Policies
We next turn our attention to the case in which the firm is restricted in the disclosure
policies it can choose among. Specifically, we examine two types of policies: recognition
policies and the subset of these policies whereby the firm withholds its value whenever it
lies either above or below a threshold, which we refer to as truncation policies. While
we previously established that recognition, and hence truncation policies, are not optimal
among the broad class of all disclosure policies, these two types of policies are nevertheless
of interest for two reasons. First, several accounting rules resemble recognition policies in
that they withhold news that does not pass a criterion, such as lowering the firm’s earnings
or exceeding a materiality threshold. Threshold policies in particular resemble accounting
standards that prescribe asset impairments when information is unfavorable, but do not
allow for positive revaluations when information is favorable.16 Thus, these policies may
be more feasible for a firm to implement than a generic disclosure policy. Second, such
policies are frequently optimal in other persuasion settings and arise endogenously in models
of voluntary disclosure. Hence, analyzing these policies offers insight into how disclosure
influences prices in the presence of noise trade in these settings.
We demonstrate three results regarding these policies. First, truncation policies are
sufficient to enable a firm to create overvaluation, as they typically lead to asymmetric
16These rules, which reflect “conservative” accounting standards, have been studied extensively in prior
literature (e.g., Bertomeu and Cheynel (2015), Göx and Wagenhofer (2010), and Friedman et al. (2019)).
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posteriors. Second, more general recognition policies can increase the firm’s expected price
relative to truncation policies by generating additional skewness in investors’ beliefs. Finally,
a recognition policy in which the firm withholds on two disjoint intervals maximizes the
expected third moment in investors’ posteriors and thus approximately maximizes the firm’s
expected price.
We begin by analyzing truncation policies. Note a recognition policy that deterministi-
cally either withholds or discloses each realization (i.e., 𝜔(𝑣) ∈ {0, 1}) can be equivalently
represented by the set of realizations that are withheld, Ω ≡ {𝑣 ∈ 𝒱 : 𝜔(𝑣) = 1}. Given
any threshold 𝑘, we define an upper truncation policy as one for which Ω = [𝑘,∞) and a
lower truncation policy as one for which Ω = (−∞, 𝑘]. When studying these policies, we
further assume that the prior distribution over the firm’s payoff is normal, 𝑣 ∼ 𝑁(𝑚𝑣, 𝜎2𝑣). In
addition to offering tractability, the normal distribution has a desirable feature for studying
truncations: it is single peaked. Not only is this feature realistic, but it also implies that,
when the lower (upper) truncated normal is negatively (positively) skewed. This appears to
be a general feature of single-peaked distributions that we are able to capture by employing
the normal prior.
As an intermediate result, we compute the ex ante expected price that arises under
truncation rules. In stating the following lemma, we let 𝜑(·) and Φ(·) denote the p.d.f. and
c.d.f. of a standard normal, respectively.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the firm’s payoff is normally distributed and let 𝜆 (𝑥) ≡ 𝜑(𝑥)
1−Φ(𝑥) .
(i) Lower truncation. If the withholding set is Ω = (−∞, 𝑘], then the ex ante expected
price is given by:





















(ii) Upper truncation. If, instead, the withholding set is Ω = [𝑘,∞), then the ex ante
expected price is given by:






















Observe that under either truncation rule, the ex ante expected price deviates from 𝑚𝑣

















This term embodies the pricing implications of a posterior that has a non-zero third central
moment: for any finite 𝑘, (9) is positive as 𝜆(·) is convex. This effect on the ex ante price
arises only when the firm’s value is withheld, and is thus multiplied by the probability of
withholding under the threshold policy. Whether expression (9) enters the pricing equation
with a positive or negative sign depends on whether the truncation is upper or lower. Under
a lower truncation, the impact on the ex ante price is negative because, conditional on
withholding, the posterior is negatively skewed. Conversely, under an upper truncation, the
impact is positive because, conditional on withholding, the posterior is positively skewed.
It thus follows that a lower truncation leads to undervaluation, while an upper truncation
always leads to overvaluation. The next proposition formalizes this result and is illustrated
in Figure 2.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the firm’s value is normally distributed. Then,
(i) Any lower truncation policy leads to an ex ante price that is strictly lower than the ex
ante expectation of the firm’s payoff, 𝑚𝑣.
(ii) Any upper truncation policy leads to an ex ante price that is strictly higher than 𝑚𝑣.
Proposition 4 implies that disclosure can lead to overvaluation even when a firm is re-
stricted to simple truncation policies, because such truncation policies are sufficient to gen-
erate positive skewness. This result demonstrates that our main finding – that firms can
generate overvaluation via disclosure – continues to hold even when firms are significantly
restricted in their commitment power. Note that, similar to the binary model, the optimal
disclosure policy (here, the threshold 𝑘) strikes a balance between the probability of creating





, and the degree of overvaluation, as captured
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E(P) under upper truncation
E(P) under lower truncation
Figure 2: Truncation policies and expected prices. Parameters: 𝜇𝑣 = 0,𝑚𝑧 = 0, 𝜎𝑧 = 1, 𝜎𝑣 = 1, 𝜌 = 1
by (9). Decreasing the threshold 𝑘 increases the probability of skewed posteriors, but, in a
neighborhood of the optimum, also lowers the degree of skewness.
In general, truncation rules are not optimal among the class of recognition policies. This
is true even in the case of a normal prior, in which truncation policies can generate significant
skewness.17 However, it is most apparent when considering relatively flat distributions such
as the uniform. In the uniform case, any truncation policy leads to a symmetric posterior,
which, in accordance with Lemma 1, induces accurate valuation. In contrast, following
the logic underlying Proposition 1, there exist recognition policies that generate positive
skewness and thus overvaluation.
To further illustrate the dominance of recognition policies over truncation policies, we
conclude by deriving the policy that maximizes the approximate price in equation (5). This
17We have found numerically that under a normal prior, there exists a recognition policy characterized by
a withholding set Ω = [𝑎, 𝑏] ∪ [𝑘,∞) (as in Proposition 5) that leads to a greater expected price than the
optimal upper truncation policy.
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Figure 3: Optimal policy vs upper truncation policy. The blue curve is the ex ante expected price
as a function of the threshold. The pink area represents the non-disclosure region under the optimal
recognition policy (using the approximate price). The black dashed line is the value of the ex ante
expected price evaluated at the optimal recognition policy. Parameters: 𝜎𝑥 = 1, 𝜎𝑧 = 1.
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analysis is instructive because the expectation of this approximate price is exactly equal
to the expected firm value adjusted by the expected third central moment in investors’
posteriors. Thus, the policy that maximizes this approximate price is precisely the one that
maximizes the expected third central moment in investors’ posteriors, E [E𝜇[(𝑣 − E𝜇[𝑣])3]].
We find that, given any prior with unbounded support, a policy that withholds realizations
above a threshold 𝑘 and in a second interval [𝑎, 𝑏] < 𝑘 maximizes this price, generating
more positive skewness than any truncation policy. Intuitively, by picking appropriately
the boundaries of these intervals, one can ensure that, given non-disclosure, most of the
probability mass is in [𝑎, 𝑏] and, at the same time, that there is still a small probability of
large realizations in [𝑘,∞). This leaves investors with a posterior that is significantly more
skewed than an upper truncation. Figure 3 illustrates these results in the case of the normal
prior.
Proposition 5. Suppose 𝒱 = R. Within the class of recognition policies, the disclosure
policy that maximizes the expected third central moment and thus the ex ante expectation
of the approximate price in (5) withholds realizations of the payoff in a set of the form
Ω = [𝑎, 𝑏] ∪ [𝑘,∞), where 𝑎 < 𝑏 < 𝑘.
6 Extensions
6.1 Multi-firm economy
In this section, we demonstrate how the case studied in the main model, in which the firm
is in zero net supply, is equivalent to studying an economy consisting of a large number
of firms in which a specific firm chooses the nature of the information it discloses about
its idiosyncratic value. This extension further shows how a firm can exhibit a positive risk
premium even under the optimal disclosure policy.
We now assume that there are 𝑁 firms. We will let 𝑁 grow large to consider the “large
economy limit,” but begin with a finite number of firms for demonstrative purposes. Firm 𝑖
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produces cash flows 𝑣𝑖 where:
𝑣𝑖 = ?̃?𝑖 + 𝑓 .






represents market-wide cash flows. The terms ?̃?𝑖 are independent
of each other and of 𝑓 , representing the firms’ idiosyncratic cash flows. Each firm has a
supply of 𝑚𝑧 = 1.
We further posit now that there are 𝐽 risk-averse investors in the model who possess
CARA utility with risk aversion 𝜌. Furthermore, in each stock, there are 𝐽 noise traders
who sell 𝑧𝑖 ∼ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎2𝑧) shares of firm 𝑖. We assume that 𝑧𝑖 are independent across firms and
independent of {?̃?𝑖}𝑖∈{1,...,𝑁} and 𝑓 . When analyzing the large economy limit, we will also
let 𝐽 approach infinity. Note that both the number of risk-averse traders and noise traders
must move to infinity alongside 𝑁 in the large economy limit. If the number of investors
did not grow, there would be an infinite amount of per-capita risk in the limit, and if the
number of noise traders did not grow, they would be washed out in the limit. Note it is also
necessary to assume that the demands of the noise traders within each firm are correlated
to ensure they do not wash away in the limit. For simplicity, we assume these demands are
perfectly correlated, so that the aggregate demand from noise traders in each firm 𝑖 is −𝐽𝑧𝑖.
We next establish the firms’ limiting prices in equilibrium.
Proposition 6. As 𝑁, 𝐽 → ∞ at the same rate, firm 𝑖’s expected price E[𝑃𝑖] satisfies:
E[𝑃𝑖] = E
{︂
E [?̃?𝑖 exp (−𝜌𝑧𝑖?̃?𝑖) |𝑧𝑖]
E [exp (−𝜌𝑧𝑖?̃?𝑖) |𝑧𝑖]
}︂
+ 𝜇𝑓 − 𝜌𝜎2𝑓 . (10)
An important feature of the price in equation (10) is that the pricing of the firm’s id-
iosyncratic and systematic risks are additively separable. This feature has three noteworthy
implications. First, the pricing of the idiosyncratic component of the firm’s cash flows,
E[?̃?𝑖 exp(−𝜌𝑧𝑖?̃?𝑖)]
E[exp(−𝜌𝑧𝑖?̃?𝑖)] , is identical to the pricing of 𝑣𝑖 in the main model. Consequently, if we as-
sume that firm 𝑖 chooses an information system that does not provide information on the
macro-factor 𝑓 that is not available from other sources, i.e., that provides novel information
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on ?̃?𝑖 only, the optimization problem is identical to the one we have analyzed above. Second,
as long as the risk premium created by the term −𝜌𝜎2𝑓 is sufficiently large, it need not be
the case that the firm is literally overvalued. And third, unless investors’ posterior about ?̃?𝑖
is symmetric, the term in (10) corresponding to the pricing of the idiosyncratic component
will be different from zero. This implies that disclosure about idiosyncratic risks can have
an effect on the risk premium even in a large economy, provided that it leaves investors with
an asymmetric posterior.
6.2 Disclosure about a systematic risk
To reiterate, our main analysis is founded upon the notion that most individual firms do not
possess significant information regarding systematic risk that is incremental to other publicly
available information. However, it is plausible that a limited number of large firms may have
such information in their possession. To provide insight into the optimal disclosure policy of
such firms, we now consider a variant of the binary model in which the firm’s shares are in
positive supply, i.e., 𝑚𝑧 > 0, which implies that the firm’s disclosure provides information
to investors that enables them to update on terminal aggregate consumption. In this case,
a second-order approximation of the average price analogous to expression (5) now yields:






2⏟  ⏞  
third-moment effect
.18 (11)
Observe that the approximate price now includes an additional risk-premium term that is
proportional to𝑚𝑧 and the conditional variance of the firm’s value. This term arises because,
in expectation, when investors hold a positive amount of the stock, they hold undiversifiable
risk. Thus, the firm faces an additional trade-off when determining the optimal disclosure
policy: additional information tends to lowers this risk premium by reducing the conditional
variance. While the firm could completely eliminate this risk premium by perfectly revealing
18See Appendix B for the derivation of this expression.
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the firm’s payoff, this would render them unable to generate positive skewness, which in-
creases the firm’s price via the third term of (11). In general, the presence of positive supply
pushes the firm towards the provision of additional information, and, in certain cases, may
lead perfect disclosure to be optimal.
Equation (11) further illustrates that the trade-off between the variance and third-
moment effects depend upon the relative magnitudes of the average supply 𝑚𝑧 and the
extent of noise trade 𝜎2𝑧. Intuitively, the average supply controls the magnitude of the risk
premium, while the extent of noise trade determines the degree to which skewness inflates
the firm’s price. The importance of the relative magnitudes of 𝑚𝑧 and 𝜎
2
𝑧 in determining the
optimal policy is particularly transparent in the binary model introduced in Section 4. In
this model, when the average supply 𝑚𝑧 grows large relative to the variance of noise trading
𝜎2𝑧, rather than the imprecise disclosure policy discussed in Proposition 3, perfect disclosure
is optimal. The proposition below states formally this result.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the firm’s payoff is binary. There exists a 𝑐 > 0 such that:
(i) perfect disclosure is optimal if and only if 𝜎2𝑧 ≤ 𝑐𝑚𝑧; whereas
(ii) if 𝜎2𝑧 > 𝑐𝑚𝑧, then the optimal disclosure policy is characterized as in Proposition 3.
This proposition suggests that large firms traded primarily by sophisticated investors
should be inclined towards providing more information, and firms in general should be in-
clined towards providing more information regarding the systematic components of their
performance.
6.3 Private information
Our baseline model assumes that the firm’s disclosure is the only source of information that
investors possess, and that trade among investors is driven entirely by the presence of noise
traders. In contrast, a large literature in finance studies the impact of private information
on trade and prices, as well as its interaction with disclosure (e.g., Diamond (1985)). In
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Appendix E, we explore the robustness of our main results to the presence of trade on
private information. To do so, we apply the techniques of Breon-Drish (2015), which enable
characterizing a rational expectations equilibrium under non-normal distributions. Moreover,
as in Section 4, we assume that 𝑣 ∈ {𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣,𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣}. In line with Hellwig (1980), in
addition to the public disclosure, each risk-averse investor 𝑖 privately observes a noisy signal
about the firm’s payoff, 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑣 + ?̃?𝑖. Letting the prior be denoted 𝑞 = Pr(𝑣 = 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣), we
show that the price function in this setting equals:






























Notice that the price directly depends on the fundamental 𝑣, as the market aggregates
investors’ noisy private signals. In this setting, our numerical analyses, depicted in Figure
4, indicate that expected price exhibits similar features as a function of the prior as in our
baseline case: this price exceeds (falls short of) the firm’s expected cash flows when the
prior is positively skewed 𝑞 < 1/2 (negatively skewed 𝑞 > 1/2). As a result, the firm’s
optimal policy is to induce a posterior that is positively skewed through imprecise disclosure
of negative news.
The presence of private information, however, does affect the quantitative nature of our
results. Figure 5 depicts the optimal imprecision of the disclosure policy as a function of
the noise in investors’ signals. As can be gleaned from the plot, the optimal degree of
imprecision increases as investors’ private information becomes more noisy. This occurs
because if investors are already well informed about the firm’s payoff, then there is little role
left for persuasion. By contrast, the firm’s ability to manipulate investors’ belief through
disclosure is enhanced when the quality of investors’ information drops.
33













Figure 4: Information design in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium. Parameters: 𝜎𝑣 = 1, 𝜌 =
2, 𝜎𝑧 = 1.5, 𝜎𝜀 = 1
.








Figure 5: The effect of private information (𝜎𝜀) on optimal imprecision. Parameters: 𝜎𝑣 = 1, 𝜌 =
1, 𝜎𝑧 = 1.
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7 Conclusion
We study a firm’s optimal choice of disclosure policy in a competitive market with noise
traders. Relative to the vast prior literature that studies disclosure in models of competitive
markets, our innovation is to generalize the firm’s choice set by allowing them to commit
to any disclosure policy. We find that, upon endowing the firm with this flexibility, their
optimal policy does not resemble the policies studied in the prior literature. Specifically, this
policy is imprecise and induces positively-skewed market beliefs regarding the firm’s value.
This policy, in turn, causes the firm’s price to exceed its expected value – independent of
investors’ prior beliefs over the firm’s value. These findings stand in contrast to the majority
of prior work on disclosure and pricing, which typically finds that the provision of additional
information enhances price efficiency. Our results also indicate that, in the presence of noise
trade, even when disclosure concerns a firm’s idiosyncratic payoffs, it can influence the firm’s
cost of capital. Taken together, our findings suggest that future work studying on disclosure’s




A Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Evaluate the pricing equation (3) at the noise-trader demand 𝑧 = −𝑧,
𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇) = E𝜇[𝑣𝑢
′(−𝑧(𝑣 − 𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇)))]
E𝜇[𝑢′(−𝑧(𝑣 − 𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇)))]
.
Substitute −𝑧(𝑣 − 𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇)) = 𝑧 (2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑣 − (2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇))) inside the argument of
𝑢′ to get
𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇) = E𝜇[𝑣𝑢
′(𝑧 (2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑣 − (2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇))))]
E𝜇[𝑢′(𝑧 (2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑣 − (2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇))))]
⇐⇒ 2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇) =
E𝜇[(2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑣)𝑢′(𝑧 (2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑣 − (2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇))))]
E𝜇[𝑢′(𝑧 (2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑣 − (2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇))))]
,
(A.1)
where we have obtained the second line by multiplying each side by −1 and adding 2E𝜇[𝑣] to
each side. Note that (A.1) is the pricing equation for the mirror random variable 2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑣.
Therefore, letting 𝜇𝑚 denote the distribution this mirror random variable, we have that
𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇𝑚) = 2E𝜇[𝑣]− 𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇) (A.2)
is a market-clearing price when the distribution is 𝜇𝑚 and noise traders sell 𝑧 units.
Then, taking expectations with respect to the noise-trader demand on both sides of (A.2)
yields
E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇𝑚)] = 2E𝜇[𝑣]− E[𝑃 (−𝑧, 𝜇)]
⇐⇒ E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇𝑚)] = 2E𝜇[𝑣]− E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)]
⇐⇒ E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇𝑚)] + E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] = 2E𝜇[𝑣],
where on the right-hand side of the second line we have substituted −𝑧 with 𝑧 (because
they are identically distributed) and in the third line we have moved E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] from the
right-hand side to the left-hand side. Evaluating the third line for symmetric distributions
(i.e., such that 𝜇 = 𝜇𝑚) yields the desired result that E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] = E𝜇[𝑣].
Proof of Lemma 2. Because |𝒱| ≥ 2, we can find 𝑣𝐿, 𝑣𝐻 ∈ 𝒱 such that 𝑣𝐿 < 𝑣𝐻 . We construct
a binary distribution with support 𝒱 ≡ {𝑣𝐿, 𝑣𝐻}. With a slight abuse of notation, we identify
the distribution 𝜇 with the probability of the high payoff, that is, we write 𝜇 ≡ Pr[𝑣 = 𝑣𝐻 ].
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At 𝜇 = 0 the distribution is degenerate, and hence symmetric. Therefore, by Lemma 1,
we have that E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)]|𝜇=0 = E𝜇[𝑣]|𝜇=0 = 𝑣𝐿. To show that there exists a 𝜇 ∈ (0, 1) that
induces overvaluation, we increase 𝜇 at the margin in a neighborhood of 𝜇 = 0.
Fix 𝑧 > 0. For this specific case, the market-clearing price is implicitly defined by
(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑃 )𝜇𝑢′ (−𝑧 (𝑣𝐻 − 𝑃 )) + (𝑣𝐿 − 𝑃 ) (1− 𝜇)𝑢′ (−𝑧 (𝑣𝐿 − 𝑃 )) = 0,
Substituting 𝜑 ≡ 𝑃 − E𝜇[𝑣] = 𝑃 − 𝑣𝐿 − 𝜇(𝑣𝐻 − 𝑣𝐿) into the previous equation, we get
Γ (𝜇, 𝜑) ≡ ((1− 𝜇) 𝑘 − 𝜑)𝜇𝑢′ (𝑧 (− (1− 𝜇) 𝑘 + 𝜑))− (𝜇𝑘 + 𝜑) (1− 𝜇)𝑢′ (𝑧 (𝜇𝑘 + 𝜑)) ,
where 𝑘 ≡ 𝑣𝐻 − 𝑣𝐿. In this way, we can directly solve for 𝜑.
By the implicit function theorem,
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝜇




Γ𝜑 (𝜇, 𝜑) =− [𝜇𝑢′ (𝑧 (− (1− 𝜇) 𝑘 + 𝜑)) + (1− 𝜇)𝑢′ (𝑧 (𝜇𝑘 + 𝜑))]
+ 𝑧 [((1− 𝜇) 𝑘 − 𝜑)𝜇𝑢′′ (𝑧 (− (1− 𝜇) 𝑘 + 𝜑))− (𝜇𝑘 + 𝜑) (1− 𝜇)𝑢′′ (𝑧 (𝜇𝑘 + 𝜑))] ,
Γ𝜑 (0, 𝜑) =− 𝑢′ (𝑧𝜑)− 𝑧𝜑𝑢′′ (𝑧𝜑) ,
and
Γ𝜇 (𝜇, 𝜑) = −𝑘𝜇𝑢′ (𝑧 (− (1− 𝜇) 𝑘 + 𝜑)) + ((1− 𝜇) 𝑘 − 𝜑)𝑢′ (𝑧 (− (1− 𝜇) 𝑘 + 𝜑))
+ 𝑧𝑘 ((1− 𝜇) 𝑘 − 𝜑)𝜇𝑢′′ (𝑧 (− (1− 𝜇) 𝑘 + 𝜑))
− 𝑘 (1− 𝜇)𝑢′ (𝑧 (𝜇𝑘 + 𝜑)) + (𝜇𝑘 + 𝜑)𝑢′ (𝑧 (𝜇𝑘 + 𝜑))− 𝑧𝑘 (𝜇𝑘 + 𝜑) (1− 𝜇)𝑢′′ (𝑧 (𝜇𝑘 + 𝜑)) ,








(𝑘 − 𝜑)𝑢′ (𝑧 (−𝑘 + 𝜑))− 𝑘𝑢′ (𝑧𝜑) + 𝜑𝑢′ (𝑧𝜑)− 𝑧𝑘𝜑𝑢′′ (𝑧𝜑)
𝑢′ (𝑧𝜑) + 𝑧𝜑𝑢′′ (𝑧𝜑)
.







[𝑢′ (−𝑧𝑘)− 𝑢′ (0)] .
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The second derivative of 𝜕𝜑(𝑧)
𝜕𝜇










𝑢′′′ (−𝑧𝑘) > 0.
Thus 𝜕𝜑(𝑧)
𝜕𝜇










E [𝑢′ (−𝑧𝑘)− 𝑢′ (0)] > 𝑘
𝑢′ (0)
E [𝑢′ (0)− 𝑢′ (0)] = 0.
The inequality above is strict because 𝑧 is assumed to be non-degenerate. This shows that
by increasing 𝜇 at the margin starting from 𝜇 = 0 one generates overvaluation. Hence, for
any binary support there exists a ?̂? ∈ (0, 1) that induces overvaluation.
Proof of Proposition 1. The claim is a special case of the proof of Proposition 2(i), which can
be found below. Under the disclosure policy that always perfectly reveals the firm’s payoff,
the firm is accurately valued. Because the policy of perfect disclosure randomizes only over
degenerate distributions, it assigns probability one to degenerate distributions. Therefore,
as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, we can construct a disclosure policy such that the
ex ante expected price is strictly greater than the ex ante expected value.
Proof of Proposition 2(i). Let 𝜏 * be an optimal disclosure policy and 𝒟 ≡ {𝛿𝑣 : 𝑣 ∈ 𝒱} be
the set of all degenerate distributions 𝛿𝑣 on the support of the prior, 𝒱 . We want to show
that, at the optimum, 𝜏 * (𝒟) = 0 or 𝜏 * (𝒟) = 𝜏 * ({𝛿𝑣*}) > 0 for a single 𝑣*. To ease the
notational burden, henceforth we simply write 𝜏 in place of 𝜏 * for the optimal disclosure
policy.
By contradiction, suppose that 𝜏 (𝒟) > 0 but 𝜏 ({𝛿𝑣}) < 𝜏 (𝒟) for all 𝛿𝑣 ∈ 𝒟. We show
that there exists a disclosure policy 𝜏 , which we define below, that strictly increases the
ex ante expected price. Let 𝜏 |𝒟 ∈ Δ(𝒟) denote the distribution of posterior distributions
conditional on the posterior distribution being degenerate, that is,
𝜏 |𝒟 (𝑆) ≡
𝜏 (𝑆)
𝜏 (𝒟)
for all measurable subsets 𝑆 of 𝒟. Because 𝜏 |𝒟 ({𝛿𝑣}) < 1 for all 𝛿𝑣 ∈ 𝒟, there must exist
(at least) two distributions 𝛿𝑣1 and 𝛿𝑣2 in the support of 𝜏 |𝒟 (𝑆). Without loss of generality,
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let us use the convention that 𝑣1 < 𝑣2. Take small non-intersecting neighborhoods around
each of these two points 𝒩𝑗,𝜂 ≡ {𝛿𝑣 ∈ 𝒟 : |𝑣 − 𝑣𝑗| ≤ 𝜂}, for 𝜂 > 0 and 𝑗 = 1, 2. Because 𝛿𝑣1
and 𝛿𝑣2 are in the support of 𝜏 |𝒟 (𝑆), we have 𝜏 |𝒟 (𝒩𝑖,𝜂) > 0, and therefore 𝜏 (𝒩𝑗,𝜂) > 0, for
𝑗 = 1, 2 and all 𝜂 > 0.
At this point, define the disclosure policy 𝜏 𝜂 (parametrized by 𝜂) as follows: for any
measurable subset 𝑆 of Δ (𝒱), let









· [𝜀1,𝜂𝜏 (𝒩1,𝜂) + 𝜀2,𝜂𝜏 (𝒩2,𝜂)] ,
where I[·] is the indicator function, 𝜀1,𝜂, 𝜀2,𝜂 ∈ (0, 1) are chosen appropriately as will be




𝒩1,𝜂 𝜇d𝜏 (𝜇) + 𝜀2,𝜂
∫︀
𝒩2,𝜂 𝜇d𝜏 (𝜇)
𝜀1,𝜂𝜏 (𝒩1,𝜂) + 𝜀2,𝜂𝜏 (𝒩2,𝜂)
.
In words, starting from the original disclosure policy 𝜏 , we are constructing another disclosure
policy 𝜏 𝜂 such that realizations of the firm’s payoff that previously were perfectly disclosed,
now are pooled into a new signal realization 𝑠 = 𝑠𝜂. Specifically, whenever the realized
payoff 𝑣 is in 𝒩𝑗,𝜂, the firm randomizes between perfect disclosure 𝑠 = 𝑣, with probability
1−𝜀𝑗,𝜂, and sending the pooling message 𝑠 = 𝑠𝜂, with probability 𝜀𝑗,𝜂. Conditional on 𝑠 = 𝑠𝜂,
investors’ posterior belief is ?̂?𝜂.
Note that the conditional distribution ?̂?𝜂 is well-defined, because the conditioning prob-
ability is strictly positive: 𝜀1,𝜂, 𝜀2,𝜂 ∈ (0, 1) and 𝜏 (𝒩1,𝜂) , 𝜏 (𝒩2,𝜂) > 0. Further, one verifies
























where the first equality follows from the definition of 𝜏 , the second equality from the definition
of ?̂?𝜂, and the third equality from the fact that the original disclosure policy 𝜏 was Bayes
plausible.
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There remains to pick suitable values for 𝜀1,𝜂 and 𝜀2,𝜂. We have shown in the proof of
Lemma 2 that for any binary support, there exists a distribution that induces overvaluation.
Here, we take the support {𝑣1, 𝑣2} and let 𝑞 ≡ Pr [𝑣 = 𝑣2] describe a distribution that induces
overvaluation. For any 𝜂 > 0, choose 𝜀1,𝜂, 𝜀2,𝜂 ∈ (0, 1) such that
𝜀2,𝜂𝜏 (𝒩2,𝜂)
𝜀1,𝜂𝜏 (𝒩1,𝜂) + 𝜀2,𝜂𝜏 (𝒩2,𝜂)
= 𝑞.19





















































|𝑣 ∈ [𝑣2 − 𝜂, 𝑣2 + 𝜂]
]︀ }︃ ,
whereas the expectation given ?̂?𝜂 is
E?̂?𝜂 [𝑣] = (1− 𝑞)E?̂?𝜂 [𝑣|𝑣 ∈ [𝑣1 − 𝜂, 𝑣1 + 𝜂]] + 𝑞E?̂?𝜂 [𝑣|𝑣 ∈ [𝑣1 − 𝜂, 𝑣1 + 𝜂]] .




and E?̂?0 [𝑣] ≡ lim𝜂↓0 E?̂?𝜂 [𝑣], by the squeeze theorem we
have
𝑃 (𝑧, ?̂?0) =
(1− 𝑞)𝑣1𝑢′ (−𝑧 (𝑣1 − 𝑃 (𝑧, ?̂?0))) + 𝑞𝑣2𝑢′ (−𝑧 (𝑣2 − 𝑃 (𝑧, ?̂?0)))
(1− 𝑞)𝑢′ (−𝑧 (𝑣1 − 𝑃 (𝑧, ?̂?0))) + 𝑞𝑢′ (−𝑧 (𝑣2 − 𝑃 (𝑧, ?̂?0)))
,
E?̂?0 [𝑣] = (1− 𝑞)𝑣1 + 𝑞𝑣2.
Recall that distribution 𝑞 leads to overvaluation, that is, E [𝑃 (𝑧, ?̂?0)] > E?̂?0 [𝑣]. Because this







Let us now compute the ex ante expected price under 𝜏 and 𝜏 𝜂′ . Under 𝜏 the ex ante
expected price is∫︁
Δ(𝒱)
E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] d𝜏 (𝜇) =
∫︁
Δ(𝒱)∖[𝒩1,𝜂′∪𝒩2,𝜂′ ]
E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] d𝜏 (𝜇) +
∫︁
𝒩1,𝜂′∪𝒩2,𝜂′




E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] d𝜏 (𝜇) +
∫︁
𝒩1,𝜂′∪𝒩2,𝜂′
E𝜇 [𝑣] d𝜏 (𝜇) ,(A.3)
where the second line uses the fact that E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] = E𝜇 [𝑣] for all degenerate 𝜇. Similarly,
19A solution 𝜀1,𝜂, 𝜀2,𝜂 ∈ (0, 1) exists, because at 𝜀2,𝜂 = 0 the left-hand side is 0 < ℎ, whereas at 𝜀2,𝜂 =
1, 𝜀1,𝜂=0 the left-hand side is 1 > ℎ.
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under 𝜏 𝜂′ the ex ante expected price is∫︁
Δ(𝒱)













E𝜇 [𝑣] d𝜏 (𝜇) + (1− 𝜀2,𝜂′)
∫︁
𝒩2,𝜂′




E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] d𝜏 (𝜇) +
∫︁
𝒩1,𝜂′∪𝒩2,𝜂′
E𝜇 [𝑣] d𝜏 (𝜇)











Taking the difference between (A.4) and (A.3) yields∫︁
Δ(𝒱)
E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] 𝑑𝜏 𝜂′ (𝜇)−
∫︁
Δ(𝒱)
E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] d𝜏 (𝜇)











which is strictly positive because it is the product of two strictly positive terms.20 Therefore,
the disclosure policy 𝜏 yields an ex ante expected price that is strictly greater than 𝜏 ,
contradicting optimality of 𝜏 .
Proof of Proposition 2(ii). Let 𝒮 ⊂ Δ(𝒱) ∖ 𝒟 be the set of all symmetric non-degenerate
distributions on the support of the prior, 𝒱 . We want to show that, at the optimum,
𝜏 * (𝒮) = 0.
Again, we simply write 𝜏 in place of 𝜏 *. By contradiction, suppose that at the optimum
𝜏 (𝒮) > 0. Let the function 𝑇 : 𝒱 → 𝒟 be given by
𝑇 (𝑣) = 𝛿𝑣








= 𝜇 ({𝑣 : 𝛿𝑣 ∈ 𝑆}) .
20The proof would be simpler if we knew that 𝜏(𝛿𝑣1), 𝜏(𝛿𝑣2) > 0, because in that case we could just take
these two distributions instead of intervals around them (i.e., we could set 𝜂 = 0). However, in general 𝛿𝑣1
and 𝛿𝑣2 may not be mass points of 𝜏 , and taking intervals around them ensures that 𝜏𝜂 improves upon 𝜏
with positive probability.
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be the measure induced by 𝜇 on 𝒟. In other words, we have performed a change of variable
𝑇 (𝑣) from the realization of firm value 𝑣 to the distribution 𝛿𝑣 that is degenerate at that
specific realization. (𝜇𝑇−1) thus represents the same distribution as 𝜇, but (𝜇𝑇−1) projects
it onto the space Δ(𝒱) of all distributions on the support, whereas 𝜇 is a distribution defined
on the support 𝒱 . Consider the alternative disclosure policy, which for all measurable subsets
𝑆 of Δ (𝒱) is defined as






(𝑆 ∩ 𝒟) d𝜏 (𝜇) .
In words, we construct the new disclosure policy 𝜏 with the following logic: whenever the
original policy 𝜏 realizes some symmetric distribution 𝜇𝑠, the new policy 𝜏 draws a realization







































𝜇d𝜏 (𝜇) = 𝜇0,
where: the second equality follows from the definition of 𝜏 (namely,
∫︀
𝒮 𝜇d𝜏 (𝜇) = 0 because,
by construction, 𝜏 (𝒮) = 0); the third equality from the change of variable 𝑣 = 𝑇−1 (𝛿𝑣) (e.g.,
see Theorem 12.46 in Aliprantis and Border (1999)); the fourth inequality by∫︁
𝒱








I [𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 ] d𝜇 (𝑣) = 𝜇 (𝑉 )
for all measurable subsets 𝑉 of 𝒱 ; and the last inequality by the fact that 𝜏 satisfied the
Bayesian plausibility constraint (1).
The ex ante expected price is the same under 𝜏 and 𝜏 , because we are substituting
symmetric distributions on the support of 𝜏 with degenerate distributions. Formally, the ex
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ante expected price under 𝜏 is∫︁
Δ(𝒱)
E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] d𝜏 (𝜇) =
∫︁
Δ(𝒱)∖𝒮
E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] d𝜏 (𝜇) +
∫︁
𝒮




E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] d𝜏 (𝜇) +
∫︁
𝒮
E𝜇 [𝑣] d𝜏 (𝜇) , (A.5)
where the second line uses the fact that all 𝜇 ∈ 𝒮 are symmetric distributions. Similarly,
The ex ante expected price under 𝜏 is∫︁
Δ(𝒱)
E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] d𝜏 (𝜇) =
∫︁
Δ(𝒱)∖𝒮


























E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] d𝜏 (𝜇) +
∫︁
𝒮
E𝜇 [𝑣] d𝜏 (𝜇) , (A.6)
where the second line uses the change of variable 𝑣 = 𝑇−1 (𝛿𝑣) and the third line follows
from E [𝑃 (𝑧, 𝛿𝑣)] = E𝜇 [𝑣]. Inspection of (A.5) and (A.6) reveals that the ex ante expected
price is the same under 𝜏 and 𝜏 .
To conclude the proof, we argue that 𝜏 cannot be an optimal disclosure policy. Indeed,










𝜇 (𝒱) d𝜏 (𝜇) =
∫︁
𝒮
d𝜏 (𝜇) = 𝜏 (𝒮) > 0,
that is, 𝜏 assigns a positive probability mass to degenerate distributions. Moreover, we must
have 𝜏 ({𝛿𝑣}) < 1 for all 𝛿𝑣 ∈ 𝒟, because all distributions in 𝒮 are non-degenerate. But then,
by Proposition 2(i) 𝜏 cannot be an optimal disclosure policies. This contradicts optimality
of 𝜏 , which we have shown to be payoff-equivalent to 𝜏 .
B Proofs of Section 4
To begin with, we derive the price under CARA utility (4) and its second-order approxi-
mations (5) and (11) around 𝑧 = 0. Under CARA utility, 𝑢(𝑤) = − exp(−𝜌𝑤), 𝑢′(𝑤) =
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exp(−𝜌𝑤), and hence (3) boils down to
𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇) =
E𝜇[𝑣 exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑣 − 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)))]
E𝜇[exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑣 − 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)))]
⇐⇒ 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇) = E𝜇[𝑣] +
E𝜇[(𝑣 − E𝜇[𝑣]) exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑣 − 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)))]
E𝜇[exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑣 − 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)))]
⇐⇒ 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇) = E𝜇[𝑣] +
E𝜇[(𝑣 − E𝜇[𝑣]) exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑣 − E𝜇[𝑣]))]
E𝜇[exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑣 − E𝜇[𝑣]))]
,
where to obtain the first equivalence we have added and subtracted E𝜇[𝑣] on the right-hand
side of the equation, and to obtain the second equivalence we have multiplied both the
numerator and the denominator by exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇) − E𝜇[𝑣])). The last line is (4) in the
main text.
As in Gromb and Vayanos (2002) (p. 371), define
ℎ(𝑧) ≡ E𝜇[exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑣 − E𝜇[𝑣]))],
which is the moment generating function of the random variable 𝑣−E𝜇[𝑣] evaluated at −𝜌𝑧.
In this way, the price can be expressed as




To approximate (4) around 𝑧 = 0, note that
ℎ(0) = 1
ℎ′(0) = 0
ℎ′′(0) = 𝜌2 E𝜇[(𝑣 − E𝜇[𝑣])2]
ℎ′′′(0) = −𝜌3 E𝜇[(𝑣 − E𝜇[𝑣])3],
therefore,
𝑃 (0, 𝜇) = E𝜇[𝑣]
𝑃 ′(𝑧, 𝜇) = −𝜌−1ℎ
′′(𝑧)ℎ(𝑧)− [ℎ′(𝑧)]2
[ℎ(𝑧)]2
=⇒ 𝑃 ′(0, 𝜇) = −𝜌E𝜇[(𝑣 − E𝜇[𝑣])2]
𝑃 ′′(𝑧, 𝜇) = −𝜌−1{ℎ
′′′(𝑧)ℎ(𝑧) + ℎ′′(𝑧)ℎ′(𝑧)− 2ℎ′(𝑧)ℎ′′(𝑧)}[ℎ(𝑧)]2 − {ℎ′′(𝑧)ℎ(𝑧)− [ℎ′(𝑧)]2}2ℎ(𝑧)ℎ′(𝑧)
[ℎ(𝑧)]4
=⇒ 𝑃 ′′(0, 𝜇) = 𝜌2 E𝜇[(𝑣 − E𝜇[𝑣])3].
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Plugging these expressions into the second-order Taylor approximation gives
𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇) ≈ 𝑃 (0, 𝜇) + 𝑃 ′(0, 𝜇)𝑧 + 𝑃 ′′(0, 𝜇)𝑧
2
2




Taking the expectation with respect to 𝑧 yields (11). Imposing 𝑚𝑧 = 0 yields (5).
B.1 Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Lemma 3. Specializing (4) to the binary setting, we have
𝑃 (𝑧, 𝑞) = 𝑚𝑣 + (2𝑞 − 1)𝜎𝑣 +
2𝑞(1− 𝑞)𝜎𝑣 exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣))− 2𝑞(1− 𝑞)𝜎𝑣 exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣))
𝑞 exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣)) + (1− 𝑞) exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣))
= 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣
𝑞 exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣))− (1− 𝑞) exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣))
𝑞 exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣)) + (1− 𝑞) exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣))
= 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣
𝑞 exp(−2𝜌𝑧𝜎𝑣)− (1− 𝑞)
𝑞 exp(−2𝜌𝑧𝜎𝑣) + (1− 𝑞)
,
where in the second line we have added the second and third terms, and in the third line
we have divided both the numerator and the denominator by exp(−𝜌𝑧(𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣)). The
expression in (6) follows from a straightforward rearranging of the last line.
Proof of Proposition 3. This is a special case of the proof of Proposition 7 below, with 𝑚𝑧 =
0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Define ?̃? ≡ exp (−2𝜌𝑧𝜎𝑣) and
𝜑(𝑞) ≡ E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝑞)]− E𝑞[𝑣] = 𝜎𝑣 E
[︂
𝑞(?̃?+ 1)− 1
𝑞(?̃?− 1) + 1




The first, second, and third derivatives of 𝜑(𝑞) with respect to 𝑞 are, respectively,
𝜑′(𝑞) = 𝜎𝑣 E
[︂
2?̃?




𝜑′′(𝑞) = 𝜎𝑣 E
[︂
4 (1− ?̃?) ?̃?
(1− (1− ?̃?) 𝑞)3
]︂
,
𝜑′′′(𝑞) = 𝜎𝑣 E
[︃
12 (1− ?̃?)2 ?̃?
(1− (1− ?̃?) 𝑞)4
]︃
.
For future reference, note that the third derivative
𝜑′′′(𝑞) > 0 for all 𝑞.





= 4 exp(−2𝜎𝑣𝜌𝑚𝑧 + 2𝜎2𝑣𝜌2𝜎2𝑧)
[︀
















The first derivative evaluated at 𝑞 = 0 and 𝑞 = 1 equals, respectively,



























𝜑′(1), 𝜑′′(1) > 0
for all parameter values.
Proof of Part (i) Let the constant 𝑐 in the statement of the proposition be given by
𝑐 ≡ (𝜎𝑣𝜌)−1. Under the condition of this part of the proposition, that is, 𝜎2𝑧 ≤ 𝑚𝑧𝜎𝑣𝜌 , we have
𝜑(𝑞) < 0 for all 𝑞 ∈ (0, 1). This is a consequence of the following two facts.
Fact I. For 𝑞 ≈ 0 we have 𝜑(𝑞) < 0.
Proof of Fact I. If 𝜎2𝑧 =
𝑚𝑧
𝜎𝑣𝜌





then this follows from 𝜑′(0) < 0.
Fact II. There does not exist any 𝑞 ∈ (0, 1) such that 𝜑(𝑞) = 0.
Proof of Fact II. By contradiction, suppose that there existed points 𝑞 ∈ (0, 1) such that
𝜑(𝑞) = 0. Let 𝑞1 denote the lowest of such points. Because 𝜑 (𝑞) < 0 for 𝑞 ≈ 0 (by Fact I),
at 𝑞 = 𝑞1 the function 𝜑(𝑞) must cross the 0-line from below, i.e., 𝜑
′ (𝑞1) ≥ 0 (otherwise, we
would have 𝜑 (𝑞) > 0 for 𝑞 in a small neighborhood to the left of 𝑞1, which together with
Fact I and continuity would contradict 𝑞1 being the lowest 𝑞 such that 𝜑 (𝑞) = 0). Also, let





Because the third derivative is always positive, there can be at most one such a point 𝑞#. If
𝜑 (𝑞) is convex everywhere (which occurs when 𝜎2𝑧 ≤ 𝑚𝑧3𝜎𝑣𝜌), then let 𝑞
# = 0. Observe that we
must have 𝑞1 ≥ 𝑞#, because 𝜑′ (0) ≤ 0 and 𝜑′ (𝑞1) ≥ 0 imply that at 𝑞 = 𝑞1 the function 𝜑 (𝑞)
has already switched from concavity to convexity. Then, 𝜑 (𝑞) > 0 for all 𝑞 > 𝑞1, because
all these values of 𝑞 are in the region where 𝜑 (𝑞) is convex. But this conclusion contradicts
𝜑 (1) = 0.
Combining Facts I and Facts II, and applying the concavification argument of Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011), we conclude that the disclosure policy that maximizes the ex ante
price is one of perfect disclosure. The optimal distribution of posteriors conditional on
public information is, therefore,
𝑞* =
{︃
1 with prob. 𝑞0
0 with prob. 1− 𝑞0
,
where 𝑞0 ≡ Pr [𝑣 = 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣] is the prior probability that the firm’s payoff is high. This
disclosure policy achieves an ex ante expected price E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝑞*)] = 𝑚𝑣.
Proof of Part (ii) We have seen before that if 𝜎2𝑧 >
𝑚𝑧
𝜎𝑣𝜌
, then 𝜑′ (0) > 0, and therefore
𝜑 (𝑞) > 0 for 𝑞 ≈ 0. Further, 𝜑′ (1) > 0 implies 𝜑 (𝑞) < 0 for 𝑞 ≈ 1. Hence, 𝜑 (𝑞) has both
a minimum and a maximum. The minimum (maximum) must be in the convex (concave)
region. That is, the minimum must be to the right of 𝑞# and the maximum to its left (note
that 𝑞# is in the interior of the interval because 𝜑′′(0) < 0 and 𝜑′′(1) > 0). Further, no
maximum (minimum) can exist in the convex (concave) region, and hence these minimum
and maximum are unique.
Applying the concavification approach of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), we concavify
𝜑 (𝑞) by taking the line passing through the point (𝑞, 𝜑) = (1, 0) that is tangent to 𝜑 (𝑞).
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Denote this line by 𝜑 = 𝛼+𝛽𝑞. Then, the parameters (𝛼, 𝛽) and the tangency point 𝑞 satisfy⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝛼 + 𝛽 = 0
𝛼 + 𝛽𝑞 − 𝜑 (𝑞)− 𝜑(1) = 0
𝛽 − 𝜑′ (𝑞) = 0
,
Using the first equation to get 𝛼 = −𝛽 (because 𝜑(1) = 0), and the third equation to get
𝛽 = 𝜑′ (𝑞), the system of equations simplifies to a single equation in one unknown,
Ψ (𝑞) = 0, (B.2)
where
Ψ (𝑞) ≡ 𝜑′ (𝑞) (1− 𝑞) + 𝜑 (𝑞) .





















< 𝜑(1) = 0 by convexity of 𝜑 (𝑞) to the right of 𝑞#. Uniqueness of
the solution follows from Ψ′ (𝑞) = 𝜑′′ (𝑞) (1− 𝑞) < 0 by concavity to the left of 𝑞#.
We are now in a position to derive the optimal disclosure policy. If the prior 𝑞0 ≤ 𝑞
defined in (B.2), then the ex ante expected price is maximized at 𝑞 = 𝑞0. The optimal
disclosure policy in this case is
𝑞* = 𝑞0 with prob. 1.
By constrast, if the prior 𝑞0 > 𝑞, then the ex ante expected price is maximized by randomizing
between 𝑞 = 1 and 𝑞 = 𝑞. The optimal disclosure policy is therefore
𝑞* =
{︃
1 with prob. 𝜋*
𝑞 with prob. 1− 𝜋*
,
where 𝜋* satisfies the Baysian plausibility constraint (7),
𝜋* + (1− 𝜋*) 𝑞 = 𝑞0.
A solution for 𝜋* exists whenever 𝑞0 > 𝑞, which is the case under consideration. This
distribution of posteriors can be implemented through a binary disclosure policy of the form
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in part (ii) of Proposition 3, where 𝜅 solves⎧⎨⎩Pr[𝑣 = 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣|𝑞* = 𝑞] = 𝑞Pr[𝑣 = 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣|𝑞* = 𝑞] = 𝑞0𝜅𝑞0𝜅+(1−𝑞0) . (B.3)






Proof of Corollary 2. Observe that 𝑞 is independent of the prior 𝑞0. We have seen that for
𝑞0 ≤ 𝑞 the optimal policy is one of full non-disclosure, which corresponds to 𝜅 = 1. For
𝑞0 > 𝑞, we can see from (B.4) that 𝜅
* (𝑞) is decreasing in 𝑞0, with 𝜅
* (𝑞)|𝑞0=𝑞 = 1 (i.e., full
non-disclosure) and 𝜅* (𝑞)|𝑞0=1 = 0 (i.e., perfect disclosure).
B.2 Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Lemma 4. To derive the equilibrium prices under each type of truncation, we make
use of the expression (B.1) above, which involves the moment generating function of the
posterior distribution. It is convenient to rewrite equivalently (B.1) as follows,




where 𝑀𝐺𝐹 (𝑡) ≡ E𝜇[exp(𝑡𝑣)] is the moment generating function of the random variable 𝑣
conditional on a posterior 𝜇.
Conditional on perfect disclosure 𝑠 = 𝑣, the price is 𝑃 (𝑧, 𝑣) = 𝑣 for all 𝑧. Conditional
on withholding 𝑠 = ∅, the posterior distribution is truncated normal. Let us consider a
normal that is truncated both from below at some 𝛼 and from above at some 𝛽. We will
then specialize the formula depending on whether we solve for the price under lower or upper
truncation. For a truncated normal, the moment generating function equals
































































































































































and the ex ante expectation of the price becomes

























































Recall that we are assuming 𝑚𝑧 = 0. Then, setting 𝛼 = −∞ and 𝛽 = 𝑘, (B.6) boils down
to the expression in part (i) of the lemma. Setting 𝛼 = 𝑘 and 𝛽 = ∞, (B.6) boils down to
the expression in part (ii) of the lemma.































Inspection of the expression in Lemma 4(i) reveals that this term enters the price with a
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negative sign. Thus, E[𝑃 (𝑧, ?̃?)] is bounded above by 𝑚𝑣 for any lower truncation threshold.
Proof of Part (ii) An argument analogous to that of part (i), but with inverted sign, shows
that E[𝑃 (𝑧, ?̃?)] is bounded below by 𝑚𝑣 for any upper truncation threshold.
Proof of Proposition 5. Inspection of (5) reveals that the objective function is the ex ante
expectation of the third central moment, E [E?̃?[(𝑣 − E?̃?[𝑣])3]]. Let 𝑚Ω ≡ E[𝑣|𝑠 = ∅] denote
the posterior expectation conditional on withholding. The firm chooses a function 𝜔 : R →
[0, 1], which for each realization 𝑣 of the firm’s payoff assigns a probability 𝜔(𝑣) of withholding





(𝑣 −𝑚Ω)3 𝜔 (𝑣) 𝑓 (𝑣) d𝑣
𝑠.𝑡.∫︁
(𝑚Ω − 𝑣)𝜔 (𝑣) 𝑓 (𝑣) d𝑣 = 0,




(𝑣 −𝑚Ω)3 𝜔 (𝑣) 𝑓 (𝑣) 𝑑𝑣 − 𝜆
∫︁
(𝑣 −𝑚Ω)𝜔 (𝑣) 𝑓 (𝑣) d𝑣.
Differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to each 𝜔 (𝑣):




= (𝑣 −𝑚Ω)3 − 𝜆 (𝑣 −𝑚Ω (𝑁𝐷))
At the optimum, 𝜓 (𝑣) > 0 (𝜓 (𝑣) < 0) implies 𝜔 (𝑣) = 1 (𝜔 (𝑣) = 0). Next, differentiate the





(𝑣 −𝑚Ω)2 𝜔 (𝑣) 𝑓 (𝑣) d𝑣 + 𝜆
∫︁
𝜔 (𝑣) 𝑓 (𝑣) d𝑣 = 0
=⇒ 𝜆 = 3
∫︀
(𝑣 −𝑚Ω)2 𝜔 (𝑣) 𝑓 (𝑣) d𝑣∫︀
𝜔 (𝑣) 𝑓 (𝑣) d𝑣
= 3Var [𝑣|𝑠 = ∅] > 0.

















. Third, it satisfies lim𝑣→−∞ 𝜓(𝑣) =
− lim𝑣→∞ 𝜓(𝑣) = ∞. Thanks to these properties, we know that 𝜓(𝑣) ≥ 0 if and only if
𝑣 ∈ [𝑚Ω −
√
𝜆,𝑚Ω] ∪ [𝑚Ω +
√
𝜆∞). We conclude that the withholding set of the optimal
recognition policy satisfies the fixed point equation Ω* = [𝑚Ω* −
√
𝜆,𝑚Ω* ]∪ [𝑚Ω* +
√
𝜆,∞),
which proves the proposition.
C Proof of Proposition 6





















𝐷ℎ (𝑣ℎ − 𝑃ℎ)
)︃]︃
= 0.
Because investors are homogenous, they hold the same positions in equilibrium. Market
clearing requires that the 𝑖th investor holds 1
𝐽
of the total supply of the 𝑖th stock. The total
supply of this stock equals its innate supply, 1, plus noise trader sales, 𝑧𝑖. So, conditional on








Let 𝑃𝑖 (z̃) denote the firm’s price for a given outcome of noise trade. Then, solving for price






































































































































































































Using the independence of ?̃?𝑖 from 𝑓 , this further reduces to:
E





























































Thus, expression (C.1) reduces to:
E
{︃
E [?̃?𝑖 exp (−𝜌 (𝐽−1 + 𝑧𝑖) ?̃?𝑖) |z̃]
E [exp (−𝜌 (𝐽−1 + 𝑧𝑖) ?̃?𝑖) |z̃]











E [?̃?𝑖 exp (−𝜌 (𝐽−1 + 𝑧𝑖) ?̃?𝑖) |z̃]
E [exp (−𝜌 (𝐽−1 + 𝑧𝑖) ?̃?𝑖) |z̃]
}︂
+ 𝜇𝑓 − 𝜌𝑁𝐽−1𝜎2𝑓 .
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Taking the large economy limit as 𝑁 and 𝐽 approach ∞ at the same rate, we have:
lim
𝑁,𝐽→∞





E [?̃?𝑖 exp (−𝜌 (𝐽−1 + 𝑧𝑖) ?̃?𝑖) |z̃]
E [exp (−𝜌 (𝐽−1 + 𝑧𝑖) ?̃?𝑖) |z̃]
}︂




E [?̃?𝑖 lim𝑁,𝐽→∞ exp (−𝜌 (𝐽−1 + 𝑧𝑖) ?̃?𝑖) |z̃]
E [lim𝑁,𝐽→∞ exp (−𝜌 (𝐽−1 + 𝑧𝑖) ?̃?𝑖) |z̃]
}︂
+ 𝜇𝑓 − 𝜌𝜎2𝑓
= E
{︂
E [?̃?𝑖 exp (−𝜌𝑧𝑖?̃?𝑖) |z̃]
E [exp (−𝜌𝑧𝑖?̃?𝑖) |z̃]
}︂
+ 𝜇𝑓 − 𝜌𝜎2𝑓 ,
which is equation (10) in the main text.
D Proof that quadratic utility yields accurate valua-
tion
In this appendix, we consider the case where investors preferences are quadratic in terminal
wealth 𝑤 (i.e., 𝑢′′′ = 0). That is, we are going to assume that 𝑢(·) takes the form
𝑢(𝑤) = 𝑤 − 𝜌
2
𝑤2 for 𝜌 > 0.
For quadratic utility to satisfy 𝑢′ > 0, the distributional and parametric assumptions of the
model have to be such that 𝑤 < 1/𝜌 for all realizations of the terminal wealth ?̃? = 𝑤.
Lemma D.1 below shows that the firm cannot induce overvaluation through its disclosure
policy, because the firm will always be accurately value regardless of investors’ posterior
distribution.
Lemma D.1. Suppose that investors’ utility is quadratic in terminal wealth. Then, any
distribution 𝜇 induces accurate valuation, E[𝑃 (𝑧, 𝜇)] = E𝜇[𝑣].
Proof of Lemma D.1. Take any distribution 𝜇. Since the distribution is fixed, we drop 𝜇
from the notation. Equation (3) for the market-clearing price can be written equivalently as
0 = E [(𝑣 − 𝑃 )𝑢′(𝑧(𝑣 − 𝑃 ))] .
In the case of quadratic utility, this boils down to
0 = E[𝑣]− 𝑃 − E
[︀






















Each of these solutions 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2} has the property that 𝜑𝑗(𝑧) = −𝜑𝑗(−𝑧) for all 𝑧, hence
E[𝜑𝑗(𝑧)] = −E[𝜑𝑗(−𝑧)] ⇐⇒ E[𝜑𝑗(𝑧)] = −E[𝜑𝑗(𝑧)] =⇒ E[𝜑𝑗(𝑧)] = 0,
where the “if and only if” exploits the fact that 𝑧 is symmetrically distributed around zero.
By definition of 𝜑, E[𝜑𝑗(𝑧)] = 0 is equivalent to E[𝑃 (𝑧)] = E[𝑣]. Therefore, we have accurate
valuation regardless of the distribution.
E Extension of the binary model where investors have
private information
In this extension of the model with binary fundamentals (Section 4), we solve for the equi-
librium price, and the ex ante expected price, when risk-averse investors not only observe
the firm’s public disclosure 𝑠, but also a private signal. In particular, we assume that each
investor 𝑖 privately observes the noisy signal 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑣+?̃?𝑖, where the error terms ?̃?𝑖 are mutually
independent across investors and independent of the firm’s payoff 𝑣. Also, we assume that
?̃?𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎2𝜀). All other assumptions are unaltered.
Our derivations follow Breon-Drish (2015). Let 𝑞 ≡ Pr[𝑣 = 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣|𝑠 = 𝑠] be the
posterior that the firm’s payoff is high conditional on public information only. Also, let
𝑞𝑖 ≡ Pr[𝑣 = 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣|𝑠 = 𝑠, 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖] be investor 𝑖’s posterior conditional on his information




[𝑞𝑖 exp (−𝜌𝐷𝑖 (𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣 − 𝑃 )) + (1− 𝑞𝑖) exp (−𝜌𝐷𝑖 (𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣 − 𝑃 ))].
Thus, investor 𝑖’s optimal demand 𝐷*𝑖 solves the first-order condition
𝑞𝑖 (𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣 − 𝑃 ) exp (−𝜌𝐷𝑖 (𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣 − 𝑃 )) = − (1− 𝑞𝑖) (𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣 − 𝑃 ) exp (−𝜌𝐷 (𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣 − 𝑃 ))
⇐⇒ log
(︂
𝑞𝑖 (𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣 − 𝑃 )








− 𝑞𝑖 (𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣 − 𝑃 )











− 𝑞𝑖 (𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣 − 𝑃 )
(1− 𝑞𝑖) (𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣 − 𝑃 )
)︂
d𝑖 = 𝑧
−𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣 − 𝑃













































d𝑖 − 2𝜌𝜎𝑣𝑧. Breon-Drish (2015)
proves that any equilibrium must take the following form in this model:
𝑃 = 𝑔 (𝑣 + 𝛽𝑧)




is a “truth plus noise” signal about 𝑣 with
conditional variance 𝛽2𝜎2𝑧. The next step is to calculate the investor’s belief in equilibrium,
for a conjectured coefficient 𝛽. A useful result is that the log-odds ratios in price are linear
in the signals, given the normally distributed errors. Next, we will prove this and then solve








Pr [𝑣 = 𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣|𝑦𝑖, 𝑃 ]




































































































(𝑦𝑖 −𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣)2
2𝜎2𝜀

















(𝜒−𝑚𝑣 − 𝛽𝑚𝑧) . (E.2)
Reinjecting (E.2) into (E.1) gives us the equilibrium price as a function of the unknown
coefficient 𝛽:



























































In equilibrium, we must have that the ratio of the coefficient on 𝑧 to that on 𝑣 in the above
equation is 𝛽 (we can safely ignore the fact that ?̃? appears in the above equation when
solving for this ratio, as we know that the ratio of the coefficient on 𝑧 to that on 𝑣 in ?̃? is




and we can write
?̃? = 𝑣 − 𝜌𝜎2𝜀𝑧.
This resembles the standard noisy rational expectations equilibrium (e.g., Hellwig (1980)).
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Using this, we can simplify the expression for the equilibrium price (E.3) as follows:






























Contrary to the model of Section 4 without private information, here the equilibrium price is
a function of the firm’s payoff, because it aggregates investors’ private signals, which depend
on the firm’s payoff. We can still compute the ex ante expected price using the law of
iterated expectations. Conditional on a realized posterior 𝑞 = 𝑞, the firm’s payoff is high
with probability 𝑞 and low with probability 1− 𝑞. Therefore, conditional on 𝑞 = 𝑞 the firm
expects an average price equal to
𝑃 (𝑞) ≡ 𝑞 E[𝑃 (𝑚𝑣 + 𝜎𝑣, 𝑧, 𝑞)] + (1− 𝑞) E[𝑃 (𝑚𝑣 − 𝜎𝑣, 𝑧, 𝑞)].
The ex ante expected price can be computed as the expectation of the average price 𝑃 (𝑞)
with respect to the posterior 𝑞. 
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